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I. INTRODUCTION
We are more than ten years past the 9/11 attacks. This is a long time. Long enough, I think, to
look back and see where we are. In this article I try to do that, and also imagine where we will go.
I want to make a big claim. This claim is that, a decade after 9/11, the United States, for political
reasons, does not have a substantive national security exception. Instead we have a membership based
H[FHSWLRQ7KHQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\H[FHSWLRQDV,GHÀQHLWLVWKHVSDFHLQZKLFKWKHSROLWLFDOEUDQFKHV
can act without observing a suspect’s individual constitutional rights.1 This exception is not substantive because it does not depend on the threat posed to the nation’s security. A substantive national
security exception, in other words, would explain what national security is, distinguishing it from
regular crime. The government could then set aside normal rights when national security—whatever
it is—is at stake.
Instead of substance, I argue that the United States has chosen membershipWRGHÀQHQDWLRQDO
security. Under membership, a suspect’s rights depend not on what he has done, but on his connection to the United States. This connection is determined by nationality and location. U.S. citizens and
people inside the country—people I call members2—get more rights, while aliens and people outside
the country—nonmembers—get fewer rights. The membership model is not substantive because it
GRHVQRWGHÀQHQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\5DWKHULWUHOLHVRQWKHIDFWWKDWQRQPHPEHUVVLPSO\KDYHIHZHU
rights against U.S. power in every context.
To see the difference between models, consider a simple hypothetical: the Executive wants to detain someone without trial. The detainee allegedly threatens U.S. national security. Under a substantive model, the Executive agency would need to make a plausible allegation that the detainee threatens mass harm, or, perhaps, is working with a terrorist group.3 Under the membership model, the
President can detain the suspect if he is not a U.S. citizen, or is arrested outside the United States, or
both.
My aim here is to prove that the United States has chosen the membership model, and explain
why. Scholars have argued about what the substance of the national security exception should be.

1 I mean the personal constitutional rights that constrain the government when it threatens, captures, detains or uses
violence against people, such as the right to Due Process and Liberty. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, §1 (highlighting respectively the right to be free from unlawful search and seizure; the right not to
be deprived from life, liberty or property, without due process of the law; and these rights as applied to the states).
 ,KDYHERUURZHGWKLVGHÀQLWLRQRI PHPEHUVKLSIURP3URIHVVRU*HUDOG1HXPDQZKRVHZRUN,DGGUHVVODWHUSee
generally Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909 (1991) [hereinafter Neuman, Whose Constitution].
1HXPDQ·VZRUNLVVXSHUE³LWGHÀQHVWKHÀHOG³EXW,GRFULWLTXHKLVWUHDWPHQWRI WKHQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\H[FHSWLRQSee
infra Part II.E.
3 There are other possible substantive models.
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These arguments are usually endorsements of international law,4 or proposals for new U.S. policies.5
But no one has explained the political dynamic that is preventing these substantive proposals from
becoming law. And while scholars have written about membership in extraterritorial rights,6 no one
has examined the relationship between membership and the national security exception.7
7KLVDUWLFOHKDVÀYHSDUWV7KHÀUVWVKRZVWKDWRXWVLGHUVKDYHIHZHUULJKWVWKDQLQVLGHUVZKHQWKH
government acts in the name of national security. The second argues that there is no good theoretiFDOUHDVRQIRUWKLVGLIIHUHQFH7KHWKLUGDUJXHVWKDWLQFKRRVLQJPHPEHUVKLSZHKDYHDYRLGHGGHÀQing national security. The fourth explains the politics that have led us to choose membership over
VXEVWDQFH7KHÀIWKH[SODLQVKRZWKHFRXUWVFDQXVHHTXDOLW\WRSXVKWKHSROLWLFDOEUDQFKHVEDFN
towards substance.
II. MEMBERSHIP IN PRACTICE
The government, when acting in the name of national security, is more likely to recognize the
rights of someone inside the country than outside it, and more likely to give rights to citizens than
aliens. Congress does this either by passing laws that target only outsiders, or by delegating discretion
to the Executive. The Executive, when exercising this discretion, has directed national security measures only at nonmembers. The courts, meanwhile, defer to the political branches’ claimed national
security power when it is used against outsiders.8
Before continuing, let me clarify terms. When I talk about people outside the country, I mean
outside the territorial United States. In the national security context—which is the focus of this
4 See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Laws of War as a Constitutional Limit on Military Jurisdiction, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. &
POL’Y 295 (2010) (offering that both international law and the U.S. Constitution constrains the jurisdiction of military
commissions); Matthew C. Waxman, The Structure of Terrorism Threats and the Laws of War, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L
L   UHÁHFWLQJRQWKHGLIIHUHQWZD\VLQZKLFKWRHYDOXDWHWKUHDWVRI WUDQVQDWLRQDOQHWZRUNVWKURXJKWKH
international humanitarian law); David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating al Qaeda Within the Law of War, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 957 (2009) (proposing that the observation of international standards of war is essential in sustaining the
war on terror); Gabor Rona, A Bull in a China Shop: The War on Terror and International Law in the United States, 39 CAL.
W. INT’L L.J. 135 (2008) (criticizing the United States for not using international standards nor its own constitutional
standards for treatment of detainees).
5 See, e.g., David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97 CAL. L. REV. 693 (2009)
[hereinafter Cole, Out of the Shadows] (proposing a new preventive-detention law); Glenn Sulmasy, The Need for a National
Security Court System, 23 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 1007 (2009) (proposing a national security court).
6 See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Fundamental Norms, International Law, and the Extraterritorial Constitution, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 307
(2011); Developments in the Law—Extraterritoriality and the War on Terror, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1258 (2011); Bruce Corey, Note,
At Writ’s End: Using the Law of Nations to Decide the Extraterritorial Reach of the Suspension Clause, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 374
(2010); Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973
(2009); José A. Cabranes, Our Imperial Criminal Procedure: Problems in the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Constitutional Law,
118 YALE L.J. 1660 (2009); Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
225 (2010) [hereinafter Cleveland, Embedded]; Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501 (2005);
Neuman, Whose Constitution, supra note 2.
7 See, e.g., Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, supra note 6.
8 The only exception is the recent policy-perfecting push by the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723
(2008), the most important Guantanamo case. E.g., id. at 766.
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article—extraterritorial rights usually are rights against executive action. When the United States
picks up a suspect in Macedonia—or any other foreign country—and imprisons him in Afghanistan,
he can try to get into U.S. court with a habeas petition.9 The question presented is whether he has
DULJKWWRKDEHDVUHOLHIDQGLI VRZKHWKHUKHKDV'XH3URFHVVDQG/LEHUW\ULJKWVDQGWKHQÀQDOO\
whether those rights were violated.10 Here, I am concerned with the question of whether a suspect
arrested abroad by U.S. forces has any rights under the U.S. constitution.11
I also use the terms “member” and “nonmember” (or, alternatively, “insider” and “outsider”).
These terms combine two different legal concepts: nationality and territoriality. Treating them as a
single category therefore obscures legal distinctions. A nonmember, as I use the term, might be a
citizen abroad, or an alien at home, or a non-U.S. citizen abroad. So something is lost by using the
word “member.” But membership is still useful; it helps explain the political dynamic behind our
national security law, in which nationality and territoriality work the same way: as proxies for otherness. When the government decides not to recognize rights, it uses nationality and territoriality to
convince citizens at home that they will not be targeted. Thus, when Congress approves of military
detention,12 the law only targets aliens. And when a court approves of targeted killing,13 it limits its
holding to U.S. action overseas even though there is no doctrinal reason to do so.14
Both nationality and territoriality determine a relationship to the United States, the relationship
that, in turn, determines the availability of individual rights. One becomes a member—a party to the
social contract with the United States—either by being a citizen or inside the United States, where
the Constitution presumptively applies.15 Both are also extrinsic to national security. Noncitizens get
fewer rights solely by virtue of being noncitizens; the same is true of people, whether U.S. citizens
RUQRWRXWVLGHWKHFRXQWU\7KXVDPHPEHUVKLSEDVHGQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\H[FHSWLRQZLOOQRWGHÀQH
national security.
In making this point I discuss four national security practices: 1) targeted killing; 2) military
detention and trial; 3) extraordinary rendition; and 4) nonmilitary preventive detention. Each tactic, I
argue, is more likely to be used against nonmembers than members. I will also look at habeas corpus,
the main vehicle for judicial review of national security detention.

9 See infra Part II.E.
10 Id.
11 I would distinguish the extraterritorial application of constitutional rights against Executive action from the
question of whether the U.S. can create laws that apply in other countries, an important but distinct question. See
E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256-59 (1991); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 402 (1987) [hereinafter THIRD RESTATEMENT].
12 See Military Commissions Act, 6WDW   FRGLÀHGDVDPHQGHGDW86&$ H  invalidated by
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
13 See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 51 (D.D.C. 2010).
14 See infra Part II.A.
15 See infra Part III.A.
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A. Targeted Killing
Targeted killing is the premeditated attempt to kill without trial.16 The United States directs targeted killing at nonmembers by only targeting people outside the United States.17 The United States
has targeted people for some time—Fidel Castro, for instance18—and has killed an alleged terrorist
and U.S. citizen in Yemen.19
That citizen was Anwar al-Aulaqi.20 Al-Aulaqi was one of several citizens who, according to the
Washington Post, was put on the targeted “capture or kill” list by the C.I.A and Air Force,21 although
he was the only named target.22 He was implicated in several attacks on the United States, including
encouraging Major Nidal Malik Hasan, the Army psychiatrist charged with killing 13 people at Fort
Hood Army Base.23 While it is clear that al-Aulaqi encouraged violence against the United States—
he called Major Hasan a hero24—his family denied that he was a terrorist.25 The C.I.A killed him with
a Predator Drone.26
We know this in part because Al-Aulaqi’s father Nasser sued to stop the United States from kill-

16 See5LFKDUG0XUSK\ $IVKHHQ-RKQ5DGVDQDue Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405,
405 (2009).
17 The discussion regarding targeted killing within the United States remains in the hypothetical realm. See Jonathan
Ulrich, 7KH*ORYHV:HUH1HYHURQ'HÀQLQJWKH3UHVLGHQW·V$XWKRULW\WR2UGHU7DUJHWHG.LOOLQJLQWKH:DU$JDLQVW7HUURULVP, 45 VA.
J. INT’L L. 1029, 1059 (2005) (describing the effect of setting a precedent that extends executive power to order targeted
killings to “any time, [sic] anywhere”); see also Mary Ellen O’Connell, To Kill or Capture Suspects in the Global War on Terror,
35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 325, 326 (2003) (arguing that the extension of allowing targeted killing anywhere in the world
would allow targeted killing within the United States).
 *DEULHOOD%OXP 3KLOLS+H\PDQQLaw and Policy of Targeted Killing, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 145, 149 (2010). Of
course, the United States may have covertly targeted people in the United States without informing us.
19 See Mark Mazzeti et. al., Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, at A1; see also
Dana Priest, U.S. Playing a Key Role in Yemen Attacks, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2010, at A1 [hereinafter Priest, U.S. Playing]
(describing the responsibility that the U.S. intelligence had in orchestrating the Yemen attacks).
20 Scott Shane, Many Terrorism Suspects Linked to the Radical Cleric Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES, November 19, 2009, at A1
[hereinafter Shane, Many Terrorism]. (stating that Al-Aulaqi was born in New Mexico but then moved to Yemen, later
returning to the United States for college and graduate school).
21 Priest, U.S. Playing, supra note 19, at A1.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Obituary: Anwar al-Awlaki, BBCNEWS (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-11658920.
26 See Jane Mayer, The Predator War, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009, at 40. Predators are remote-controlled and
unmanned. Id. The United States uses them for targeted killings in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Times Topics: Predator
Drones, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2010), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/u/unmanned_
aerial_vehicles/index.html [hereinafter Times Topics: Predator Drones]. There are currently two drone programs, one run
by the military and the other by the C.I.A. Mayer, supra at 26. While the military releases information about its drone
SURJUDPWKH&,$XVHVGURQHVFRYHUWO\(ULF6FKPLWW 0DUN0D]]HWWLIn a First, U.S. Provides Pakistan with Drone Data,
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2009, at A14; David Zucchino, Combat by Camera, LOS ANGELES TIMES, July 6, 2010, at A1. The
United States’ use of Predators is increasing; the Obama administration expanded the CIA program in late 2009. Times
Topics: Predator Drones.
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LQJKLVVRQ´XQOHVVKHSUHVHQWVDFRQFUHWHVSHFLÀFDQGLPPLQHQWWKUHDWWROLIHRUSK\VLFDOVDIHW\µ27
and “there are no means other than lethal force that could reasonably be employed to neutralize the
threat.”28 In other words, Nasser was pressing for a substantive national security test—one tied to the
threat his son posed and the government’s ability to respond.
The court dismissed Nasser’s claim,29 in part because it presented a political question30 that is
constitutionally committed to the political branches and therefore nonjusticiable.31 The court was, in
its view, incompetent to assess the use of “military force against a terrorist target overseas.”32
This holding is radical in its own way. No other modern court has held that the Executive can
target a U.S. citizen on mere allegations of terrorism.33 Indeed, it presents the Executive with a dangerous power (the court describes it as “unsettling”34).
Presumably, this is why the decision is limited to overseas targets. But—and this is the oddity of
the decision—there is no doctrinal reason for this. In fact, doctrine suggests a different outcome.
As Professor Kevin Jon Heller has noted,35 U.S. law expressly provides that even the overseas killing
of a U.S. national is murder.36 Congress has made it perfectly clear that the law protects U.S. citizens
when they go abroad. There is no precedent for the removal of rights of U.S. citizens on politicalquestion grounds. No court has ever used the political-question doctrine to dismiss a citizen’s claim
that his rights were violated by U.S. action abroad.37 Moreover, the law of extraterritoriality—the
doctrine that governs whether the Constitution applies abroad—dictates the opposite result. U.S.
citizens abroad do have constitutional rights. There is no ambiguity about this: “When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad . . . the Bill of Rights and other parts of the
Constitution provid[ing] to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he

27 Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2010).
28 Id.
29 The court held that 1) al-Aulaqi’s father lacked standing and 2) the case was barred by the political-question
doctrine and 3) the threat of a future state-sponsored extrajudicial killing was not a cognizable tort under the Alien Tort
Statute. See generally Id.
30 Id. at 52.
31 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-38 (1962).
32 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 47 (emphasis added).
33 Courts have not even allowed surveillance of U.S. citizens on the grounds of suspicion of terrorism or national
security threat. See Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that presidential directives do not
overcome the requirement for a warrant in the domestic installation of wiretaps); see also Amnesty Int’l U.S.A. v. Clapper,
638 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 2011) (summarizing the amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
which continue the prohibition of targeting those within the United States for surveillance in a manner inconsistent with
the Constitution of the United States).
34 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 51.
35 Kevin Jon Heller, Let’s Call Killing al-Awlaki What It Is — Murder, OPINIO JURIS (April 8, 2010), http://opiniojuris.
org/2010/04/08/lets-call-killing-al-awlaki-what-it-is-murder/.
36 “A person who, being a national of the United States, kills or attempts to kill a national of the United States while
such national is outside the United States” shall be punished, if relevant, as murder. See 18 U.S.C. § 1119 (2006); see also id.
§ 1111 (2006).
37 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 49.
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happens to be in another land.”38 Citizens abroad have the right to jury trial.39
The political-question holding rests on the fact that the decision to kill Al-Aulaqi was a “military” decision (although technically this is wrong)40 that related to “national security.”41 But military
and national security actions are not inherently territorial. There is no doctrinal reason that a decision authorizing targeted killing on the basis of national security should apply only overseas.
The holding makes sense, though, as a political story. The decision to use armed drones in Nevada would be more controversial than the decision to use them in Yemen. Presumably courts would
be more likely to intervene—to actually enjoin the use of force—if it were on U.S. soil. So the
Executive chooses not to target people in the United States, and the court refuses to authorize using
drones in the United States.
This is not to say that the judgment was wrong.42 It might be right for the wrong reason. A
VXEVWDQWLYHGHÀQLWLRQPLJKWKDYHDOORZHGWKHJRYHUQPHQWWRWDUJHW$O$XODTL$O$XODTLZDVDOOHJHGO\LQDUHPRWHSDUWRI <HPHQRXWVLGHRI WKHRIÀFLDOJRYHUQPHQW·VFRQWURO43 This changes the risk
involved in capturing him. A substantive rule could take this risk into account, factoring location
into a test based on threat posed, and the government’s capacity to respond. But if the government
could have legally targeted Al-Aulaqi because 1) he posed an active threat and 2) it would have unduly risked U.S. lives to arrest him, then that should be the test. As with other national security issues, this
question is not hypothetical. The government is now trying to kill three other unknown Americans44
who might be protected under a substantive test.
B. Military Detention and Trial
Perhaps because military detention is controversial, the Executive rarely uses it at home. Of all
the post-9/11 detainees arrested in the United States, only two—Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri45 and

38 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957).
39 Id. at 18-19.
40 As best we can tell, the CIA, not the Air Force, is running the operation, although they now work together. See
-XOLDQ(%DUQHV $GDP(QWRXV, Yemen Covert Role Pushed: Foiled Bomb Plot Heightens Talk of Putting Elite U.S. Squads in
CIA Hands, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (Nov. 1, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870447790457558663
4028056268.html. The CIA is not a military organization, but a paramilitary one. Still the CIA is an extraterritorial agency,
limited in its domestic operations. 50 U.S.C. § 403-4a(d)(1) (2006) (denying any police, law enforcement, subpoena, or
internal-security functions to the CIA). The same is true of the Air Force. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006) (describing the
repercussions for employing any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus). A rule that says targeted killing is
okay when done by the CIA or Air Force is thus a rule that keeps targeted killing outside the United States.
41 Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 49-52.
42 For a good discussion see John C. Dehn, Targeted Killing: The Case of Anwar Al-Aulaqi, 159 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 175
(2010)..
 %DUQHV (QWRXVsupra note 40.
44 Priest, U.S. Playing, supra note 19 at A1
45 For a partial history, see al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 216-17 (4th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), vacated and remanded
by al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009).
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Jose Padilla—were put into military detention. 46 Both challenged their detentions in court.47 The
President eventually chose to move them both into criminal detention rather than argue the militarydetention issue in the Supreme Court.48
For people arrested within the United States, the Executive has chosen criminal detention. This
is less true with people arrested abroad. Detainees picked up overseas were housed at Guantanamo49
and Bagram Air Force Base.50 Yaser Hamdi, a U.S. citizen picked up in Afghanistan, was also kept in
military detention.51 Courts have approved these detentions, subject to procedural requirements.52
Congress also directs military detention at outsiders. The portion of the Military Commissions
Act (MCA) that creates a statutory framework for military trial applies only to alien unprivileged
enemy belligerents.53 The act sweeps very broadly, taking in people who have “purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents.”54 This material-support
provision seems at odds with international law.55 The habeas-stripping provisions of the MCA also
apply only to noncitizens.56
The targeting of outsiders is included in the most recent national-defense authorization, now approved in the House but not the Senate. The bill restricts detainee treatment and procedure, but only
46 For a history of the proceedings see Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1062-64 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
47 Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 386 (4th Cir. 2005); al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 216-17.
48 After a complicated series of opinions giving conditional support for the Executive’s view, see generally Padilla, 423
F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005), al-Marri, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), the Supreme Court granted certiorari to al Marri. AlMarri v. Pucciarelli, 129 S. Ct. 680 (2008). Rather than argue at the Supreme Court, the Executive transferred al Marri to
the criminal system. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009). The President transferred Padilla into criminal custody
before the Supreme Court reviewed his petition for certiorari. Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1062-64 (2006) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
49 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 723 (2008).
50 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
51 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
52 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 723; Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 99; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516-24. It is important to distinguish
between executive power to detain and the right to habeas. They are separate (although obviously closely linked) analyses.
53 Military Commissions Act, 3XE/1RG6WDW   FRGLÀHGDVDPHQGHGDW
86&$ H   GHÀQLQJMXULVGLFWLRQRI PLOLWDU\FRPPLVVLRQV 7KLVPD\OHDYHWKHGRRURSHQIRUPLOLWDU\WULDORI 
citizens on other authority (based, for example, on executive power alone, or other statutes). For a fuller discussion see
Jack Balkin, Does the Military Commissions Act Apply to Citizens?, BALKINIZATION (Sept. 29, 2006), http://balkin.blogspot.
com/2006/09/does-military-commissions-act-apply-to.html.
54 Military Commissions Act, § 948a(1)(A)(i), 120 Stat. at 2601.
55 Which does not mean that it is unconstitutional or invalid. See Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed

&RQÁLFW, 103 AM. J. INTL /   GLVFXVVLQJWKH0&$DQGLWVGHÀQLWLRQVDVWKH\KDYHEHHQOHJDOO\
utilized).
56 Military Commissions Act, 6WDW   FRGLÀHGDVDPHQGHGDW86&$ H  invalidated by
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). The MCA does contain some substantive provisions: it lists offenses triable
by military commission. Military Commissions Act, § 950v(b), 120 Stat. at 2626. But it does not provide that it is the
sole Congressional authority for military commissions. See Balkin, supra note 53 (explaining that Department of Defense
determinations are not conclusive and the legality of detaining “enemy combatants” at Guantanamo should be reviewed
E\WKHFRXUWV ,WLVWKXVEHWWHUUHDGDVDQDXWKRUL]DWLRQRI H[LVWLQJSUDFWLFHV³VSHFLÀFDOO\WKHSRVW%XVKGHWHQWLRQ
polices—than as a limit on the national security power.
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for noncitizen detainees (excluding alien members of the armed forces).57 It prevents the Executive
from transferring alien detainees to the United States.58 The bill, if passed as is, would attempt to
limit executive power. But this limitation does not prevent the executive from using military detention. Rather it requires military detention for some59 terroristic offenses.607KLVVXEVWDQWLYHGHÀQLWLRQ
of national security applies, again, only to “any person who is not a citizen of the United States.”61
We can wonder, as with other national security laws, whether the MCA would be different if it
applied to citizens. Certainly the law was sold as targeting outsiders. Senator Lindsey Graham, the
bill’s sponsor, said that the MCA was needed to stop enemy aliens from having “an unlimited right
of access to our federal courts like a U.S. citizen.”62 Indeed, the MCA is rarely used against citizens
due to the controversial nature of that application.
C. Extraordinary Rendition
Extraordinary rendition is the transfer of someone, without due process, to another place where
there is a risk of torture.63 Every documented target of U.S. extraordinary rendition has been an
outsider—an alien arrested abroad.64 There is evidence that the United States uses extraordinary
rendition for interrogation. The idea is to transfer a prisoner to an allied state, one where torture
is routine, so that the United States need not torture directly.65$VDJRYHUQPHQWRIÀFLDOVDLGWRWKH
Washington Post, “We don’t kick the shit out of them. We send them to other countries so they can

57 See+5WK&RQJ   UHVWULFWLQJWKHGHÀQLWLRQRI DQ´LQGLYLGXDOGHWDLQHGDW*XDQWDQDPRµ .
58 Id. at § 1039.
59 The alleged crime also must be subject to trial by military commission under military law. Id. at § 1042.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Neil A. Lewis and Kate Zernike, Measures Seek to Restrict Detainees’ Access to Courts, N.Y. TIMES, September 21, 2006,
at A22.
63 Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1333, 1336 (2007) [hereinafter Satterthwaite, Rendered].
64 As with other practices, there is always the chance that the United States has secretly rendered citizens and never
been caught. But all the documented cases involve foreign nationals. See id. at 1338-43 (listing examples of extraordinary
rendition of foreign nationals); Leila Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, Torture, and Other Nightmares from the War on
Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200, 1217-18 (2007) (noting that the United States has not claimed the power to render
a U.S. citizen to a foreign country for interrogation). We can distinguish the case of Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, a U.S. citizen
arrested in Saudi Arabia who alleged he was tortured, in that Abu Ali was never transferred—he was arrested and
detained in Saudi Arabia. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 224-26 (4th Cir. 2008), appealed after new sentencing hearing
United States v. Abu Ali, 410 Fed. App. 673 (4th Cir. 2011). And, like all the other U.S. citizens captured in the “war on
terror,” Abu Ali was eventually transferred into criminal custody. Id. at 226. Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen, was arrested
E\FXVWRPVLQ-).DLUSRUWEHIRUHKHRIÀFLDOO\HQWHUHG86WHUULWRU\COMM. ON INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE ASS’N OF
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. & CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TORTURE BY PROXY:
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW APPLICABLE TO “EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS,” 14-16(2004) [hereinafter TORTURE BY
PROXY], available at http://www.nyuhr.org/docs/TortureByProxy.pdf.
65 TORTURE BY PROXY, supra note 64, at 14-16.
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kick the shit out of them.”66
Some alleged rendition victims have sued in U.S. courts. They all lost on the pleadings. In Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.,67 for instance, transferees sued Jeppesen, a private company that allegHGO\DUUDQJHGDLUÁLJKWVIRUWKH&,$68 Their stories are brutal:
 One plaintiff alleged the following: that Swedish authorities arrested him in Sweden.69
+HZDVKDQGHGRYHUWRWKH&,$DQGÁRZQWR(J\SW70+HZDVKHOGIRUÀYHZHHNV´LQD
squalid, windowless, and frigid cell,” where he was beaten and shocked with electrodes
on his ear lobes, nipples and genitals.71 According to plaintiffs, “every aspect of [his]
rendition, including his torture in Egypt, has been publicly acknowledged by the Swedish
government.”72
 An Italian citizen was arrested and detained in Pakistan on immigration charges.73 He
alleged the following: that after several months in Pakistani detention, he was given to
$PHULFDQRIÀFLDOV74 They dressed him in a diaper and a torn t-shirt and shackled and
EOLQGIROGHGKLPIRUDÁLJKWWR0RURFFR75 Moroccan security services beat him, denied
him sleep and food, and threatened him with sodomy and castration.76
 An Ethiopian citizen was arrested in Pakistan on immigration charges.77 He alleged
WKHIROORZLQJWKDWKHZDVÁRZQWR0RURFFR78 where Moroccan authorities beat him,
breaking his bones.79 Using a scalpel, they cut his penis and poured “hot stinging liquid”
into the wounds.80 He was later transferred to Guantanamo, where he was imprisoned
IRUÀYH\HDUV81 Eventually he was released to the United Kingdom.82
The CIA picked up another alleged victim, the German citizen Khaled el-Masri, in

 'DQD3ULHVW %DUWRQ*HOOPDQU.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations; ‘Stress and Duress’ Tactics Used on Terrorism
Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at A1.
67 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010).
68 Id. at 1073.
69 Id. at 1074-75.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d at 1074-75.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d at 1074-75.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
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Macedonia. 83 The CIA stripped, beat and shackled him, “dressed [him] in a diaper, injected [him]
ZLWKGUXJVµWKHQÁHZKLPWR$IJKDQLVWDQDQGNHSWKLPIRUIRXUPRQWKV84 It was probably a case of
mistaken identity.85 The man who was actually arrested, however, was “an entirely innocent man.”86
Eventually the CIA realized its mistake, dumped him in Albania, and admitted the error to Germany.87 But when el-Masri sued the United States, the government invoked the state-secrets doctrine,
allowing it to withhold the evidence he needed to make his case.88 He lost.89
The state-secrets doctrine allows the government to privilege information in the “interest of
national security.”90 It has been used against U.S. citizens at home.91 But, in those cases, there was no
allegation of torture or other gross human-rights abuses.92 We should wonder, again, if the public
would allow this if the detainees were innocent U.S. citizens picked up at home. If the answer is no,
we should then wonder what it is about el-Masri or the others that allows us to treat them differently.
If my thesis is correct—that the U.S. is avoiding dealing with the consequences of its national
security practices by directing them at outsiders—then it would follow that extraordinary rendition,
which is the most brutal national security practice, is also the most “outside.” Rather than directing
it at aliens in the United States, or citizens abroad, extraordinary rendition is reserved for those who
are least visible: aliens abroad. Indeed, the point of extraordinary rendition is to physically move
torture somewhere far from the United States.

83 See Dana Priest, Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake: German Citizen Released After Months in ‘Rendition,’
WASH. POST., Dec. 4, 2005, at A1 [hereinafter Priest, Wrongful].
84 Khaled El-Masri, I Am Not a State Secret, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2007, at A14.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.; Priest, Wrongful, supra note 83, at A1.
88 El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
89 Id. at 313.
90 Id. at 302
91 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1953). When three civilians died in a military plane crash, for
instance, the government invoked the privilege to protect the accident report from discovery. Id. And it has been used to
stop discovery in contract claims between military contractors and the government, most recently in General Dynamics
Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900, 1910 (2011).
92 Professor Robert Chesney has written about the drift of the state-secrets privilege from a law that prevents civil
recovery to a law that potentially obstructs public justice by protecting illegal government behavior. See Robert Chesney,
The Jeppessen Decision and the Issue of Good Faith in Asserting the State Secrets Privilege, LAWFARE, Sept. 15, 2010, http://www.
lawfareblog.com/2010/09/the-jeppessen-decision-and-the-issue-of-good-faith-in-asserting-the-state-secrets-privilege/.
The cases from U.S. citizens alleged civil wrongs and unconstitutional surveillance. See id.; Al-Haramain Islamic Found.,
Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2007). Surveillance is an interesting test case for my hypothesis, because it
has been applied to insiders. See id. At the same time, it is the least intrusive of the national security measures used by
the government. It is telling that the one national security practice that is (sometimes) directed at insiders is the least
disruptive. Even so, national security surveillance still targets outsiders more than insiders; FISA restricts the collection
of foreign intelligence information in the United States, but not outside the United States. See Foreign Intelligence
6XUYHLOODQFH$FW ),6$ RI 3XE/1R6WDW FRGLÀHGDW86& I   6XSS,,
2002)).

26

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF

Vol. 2, No. 1

D. Preventive Nonmilitary Detention
%\SUHYHQWLYHGHWHQWLRQ,PHDQGHWHQWLRQ³XQMXVWLÀHGE\QRUPDOFULPLQDOSURFHGXUH³WKDWLV
intended to stop a national security threat. There was a wave of preventive detentions after 9/11,
but no preventive-detention statute authorized these detentions.93 Rather, they were pretextual, justiÀHGE\ODZVSDVVHGIRURWKHUUHDVRQV94
The burden of preventive detention fell hardest on noncitizens. The main source of post-9/11
preventive-detention authority was immigration law.95 After 9/11, the Bush administration preventively detained over 5,000 foreign nationals, most of them Arab or Muslim.96 Many were not charged
with immigration violations, and some were held after judges had ordered them released.97 But “not
one of the more than 5,000 detained foreign nationals was convicted of a terrorist offense.”98
Along with immigration law, the other authority for the 9/11 detentions was the material-witness
statute. This statute authorizes the detention of witnesses to secure testimony in a criminal proceeding, and is not limited to aliens.99 Of the seventy or so people detained under the statute, only
seventeen were U.S. citizens.100
The 9/11 attackers were noncitizens, so it makes sense that the government’s immediate response would target noncitizens. But we see the membership dynamic in play in the different remedies available after wrongful preventive detention. Members who were mistakenly detained were
much more able to remedy this situation. Abdullah al-Kidd, for instance, was a U.S. citizen arrested
in the United States.101 He was held in terrible conditions, but released after sixteen days.102After
release, al-Kidd sued Attorney General Ashcroft, two FBI agents, and the wardens who controlled
his detention.103 The wardens settled the case.104 And while the Supreme Court dismissed the claim
against Ashcroft,105 the suit against the FBI agents is still pending.106
93 See Cole, Out of the Shadows, supra note 5 at 693.
94 Id. at 695.
95 Some preventive detentions were also military. I have already addressed military detention. See supra Part IB.
Finally, other preventive detentions were accomplished through a pretextual use of criminal laws. See Cole, Out of the
Shadows, supra note 5, at 703. For my purposes ordinary criminal prosecution, even if pretextual, is outside the national
security exception because it affords ordinary rights and defenses.
96 See Cole, Out of the Shadows, supra note 5, at 703.
97 See Cole, Out of the Shadows, supra note 5, at 704.
98 Cole, Out of the Shadows, supra note 5, at 704.
99 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2006).
100 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WITNESS TO ABUSE (2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/print/reports/2005/06/26/
witness-abuse.
101 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2079 (2011).
102 Id.
103 Al-Kidd v. Gonzales, 2006 WL 5429570, *1 (D. Idaho 2006), rev’d in part by Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074
(2011).
104 Two of them agreed to reform their detention practices. See ACLU, ABDULLAH AL-KIDD V. JOHN ASHCROFT, ET AL.,
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights-national security/abdullah-al-kidd-v-john-ashcroft-et-al.
105 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2085 (2011).
106 Id. (Kennedy J., concurring) (“The Court’s holding is limited to the arguments presented by the parties and leaves
unresolved whether the Government’s use of the Material Witness Statute in this case was lawful.”).
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Compare al-Kidd to el-Masri (or, for that matter, any of the extraordinary-rendition victims or
Guantanamo detainees). Both were mistakenly perceived to be national security threats. But Al-Kidd
was released after sixteen days; el-Masri after more than four months. Al-Kidd was shackled; el-Masri was beaten, injected with drugs, and dressed in a diaper. Al-Kidd won a monetary settlement, and
still has a chance of winning on the merits. El-Masri has no such chance.
When it comes to laws that are designed for preventive national security detention, outsiders
are also targets. Section 412 of the Patriot Act gives the Attorney General the power to remove or
LQGHÀQLWHO\GHWDLQDOLHQVIRUQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\UHDVRQV107 There are some restrictions: the Attorney
General has to charge the alien within seven days and periodically certify that there are reasonable
grounds to believe he or she is a national security risk.108 Some applications of Section 412 may be
unconstitutional;109 perhaps for this reason it has never been used.110 And the Enemy Alien Act,
passed in 1798, provides that when the United States has declared war it can remove or detain unnaturalized citizens of the enemy state.111 There need not be an individualized determination of
hostility—it is enough that the detainee is a citizen of the enemy state.112
E. Habeas
Habeas is at the heart of post-9/11 constitutional litigation. The Guantanamo detainees, imprisoned by the military, turned to the remedy of habeas corpus to challenge their detentions. This
effort culminated in Boumediene v. Bush. In Boumediene, the Court ruled for the prisoners, holding that
the Constitution grants courts jurisdiction to review their cases.113
The Boumediene detainees—the prisoners trying to get into federal court—were captured outside
the United States. As the Court noted, they came from all over:
6RPHZHUHDSSUHKHQGHGRQWKHEDWWOHÀHOGLQ$IJKDQLVWDQRWKHUVLQSODFHVDVIDU
away from there as Bosnia and Gambia. All are foreign nationals, but none is a citizen
of a nation now at war with the United States. Each denies he is a member of the al
Qaeda terrorist network that carried out the September 11 attacks or of the Taliban
regime that provided sanctuary for al Qaeda.114
Lakhdar Boumediene, the lead petitioner, lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) when he was

 86$3$75,27$&7RI  3XE/1R6WDW  FRGLÀHGDW86&
(2006)).
108 Id.
109 See Shirin Sinnar, Note, Patriotic or Unconstitutional? The Mandatory Detention of Aliens Under the USA PATRIOT Act,
55 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 1455 (2003).
110 Cole, Out of the Shadows, supra note 5 at 748.
111 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2006).
112 See id.
113 553 US 723, 766 (2008).
114 Id. at 724.
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arrested.115 He worked for the Red Crescent.116 For reasons that are still unclear, the United States
believed that Boumediene was planning to blow up the U.S. and British embassies in Sarajevo.117 The
8QLWHG6WDWHVWKHQDVNHG%RVQLDWRDUUHVW%RXPHGLHQHDQGÀYHRWKHUVHYHQWKRXJKWKH%RVQLDQ
police had no independent reason to suspect them.118 The Bosnians complied.119 After the arrest,
Bosnian police tried to verify U.S. claims, but could not.120 The prisoners, arrested without evidence,
petitioned the Bosnian courts.121 The Bosnian High Court ordered them freed.122 Then, according
WR%RVQLDQRIÀFLDOVWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVWKUHDWHQHGWRVXVSHQGGLSORPDWLFUHODWLRQVZLWK%RVQLDDQG
remove the peacekeeping troops.123 The United States denies this allegation, but does admit to using
diplomatic pressure.124 In response, Bosnia handed the prisoners to the United States.125
In Guantanamo, military commissions tried the detainees.126 These tribunals found that the
detainees were “enemy combatant[s],” which, according to the Executive, gave it authority to detain
them.127 But the evidence against Boumediene and the others was not strong. The following exchange, from the hearing of detainee Ait Idir, is typical.128 Idir was accused of associating with an al
Qaeda operative,129 but he was never told who that person was:130
Detainee: Give me his name.
Tribunal President: I do not know.
Detainee: How can I respond to this?
Tribunal President: Did you know of anybody that was a member of Al Qaida?
Detainee: No, no.
...
115 Edward Cody, Algerian Lakhdar Boumediene Tells of Struggle After 7 Years at Guantanamo Bay, WASH. POST., May 26,
2009, at A1.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Seema Jilani, Algerians, Freed from Guantanamo, Still Paying the Price, MCCLATCHY (Sept. 9, 2009), http://www.
mcclatchydc.com/2009/09/09/75134/algerians-freed-from-guantanamo.html.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Cody, supra note 115, at A14.
122 Jilani, supra note 118.
123 See id. at 733-34.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 734 (2008).
127 See id.
128 Brief for Boumediene Petitioners at *4 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), 2007 WL 2441590.
129 Id.
130 Id.
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Tribunal President: No?
Detainee: No. This is something the interrogators told me a long while ago. I
asked the interrogators to tell me who this person was. Then I could tell you if I might
have known this person, but not if this person is a terrorist. Maybe I knew this person
as a friend. Maybe it was a person that worked with me. Maybe it was a person that
was on my team. But I do not know if this person is Bosnian, Indian or whatever. If
you tell me the name, then I can respond and defend myself against this accusation.
Tribunal President: We are asking you the questions and we need you to
UHVSRQGWRZKDWLVLQWKHXQFODVVLÀHGVXPPDU\131
Boumediene eventually won in the Supreme Court, and his case was remanded to district
court.1327KHUHVL[\HDUVDIWHUKLVDUUHVWDFRXUWÀQDOO\UHYLHZHGWKHHYLGHQFHDJDLQVWKLP133 It was
´FRQWDLQHGLQDFODVVLÀHGGRFXPHQWIURPD>@>VLQJOH@XQQDPHGVRXUFHµWKDWLQGLFDWHG%RXPHGLHQH
LQWHQGHGWRJRWR$IJKDQLVWDQDQGÀJKWDJDLQVWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV134 The Court concluded that clasVLÀHGUHSRUW´ZDVXQGRXEWHGO\VXIÀFLHQWIRUWKHLQWHOOLJHQFHSXUSRVHVIRUZKLFKLWZDVSUHSDUHGµ
EXWLQVXIÀFLHQW´WRSURWHFWSHWLWLRQHUVIURPWKHULVNRI HUURQHRXVGHWHQWLRQµ135 The district court
ordered Boumediene’s release,136 and he was set free in the spring of 2009.137
The larger question was whether Congress could stop federal courts from hearing habeas petitions from prisoners in Boumediene’s position. To understand this larger issue, we need to look at
habeas itself. The writ of habeas corpus provides collateral review of detention.138 More simply, it
allows a person detained outside the federal criminal system to argue their case in federal court. Once
the writ139 is granted, the detaining authority—in this case the U.S. military—must justify the detention to the court.140,I WKHIHGHUDOFRXUWGRHVQRWÀQGWKDWWKHGHWHQWLRQLVMXVWLÀHGLWFDQRUGHUWKH
prisoner released.141
The right to habeas is part of the Constitution: “The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
131 Id. at 4-5.
132 Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 194 (D.D.C. 2008), reversed as to another party by Bensayah v. Obama, 610
F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
133 Id. at 193.
134 Id. at 197.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 198.
137 Jilani, supra note 118.
138 17B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4261 (2011)
139 The “writ” is the order from the court to the person detaining the prisoner. Id.
140 Id.
141 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 US 723, 779 (2008). There has been continuing controversy, though, about the
power of federal courts to order the Executive to resettle Guantanamo detainees into the United States when other
resettlement offers are available. See, e.g., Kiyemba v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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it.”142 However, the Bush administration moved the detainees in Guantanamo relying on the belief
that, once placed in Guantanamo, the detainees would have no way to get into court.143 Despite
this belief, the Supreme Court held that courts could hear habeas petitions from Guantanamo.144 But
unlike in BoumedieneWKLVÀUVWKROGLQJZDVEDVHGRQWKHODQJXDJHRI WKHIHGHUDOKDEHDVVWDWXWHQRW
the Constitution.145 Because this holding was based only on the statute, Congress had the power to
change it, and did. In 2006, Congress rewrote the habeas law to take the power to hear habeas petitions from Guantanamo detainees away from federal courts. The new section provided that courts
had no jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions from aliens who had been “determined . . . to have been
properly detained as an enemy combatant.”146
One of the questions raised in Boumediene, then, was whether this law passed by Congress—a law
that applied only to noncitizens—trumped the constitutional guarantee of habeas. Like many cases
in the national security line, the question posed in Boumediene mixes up membership and national
security. The question, as framed by the Court, was whether the court could deny habeas to people
with the following attributes: 1) aliens; 2) arrested abroad; 3) detained abroad and 4) deemed enemy
combatants by the military.147
7KHÀUVWWKUHHDWWULEXWHVJRWRPHPEHUVKLSWKHODVWJRHVWRVXEVWDQFH7KH&RXUWFRXOGKDYH
used Boumediene to explain how substantive and membership factors interacted. In the end, though,
the court did not separate membership from national security. Instead, the Court’s test took every
factor into account, without explaining why they mattered or how to weigh them. In the Court’s
words, the right to habeas depends on: (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites
where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.148
Leaving aside the third factor, this test tells courts to look at both membership and national
security. The nationality and location of detainees matters, but so does their status as enemy combatants. But the test does not explain how or why membership matters. Presumably, an alien is less
likely to get habeas than a citizen. Also presumably, someone outside the country is less likely to win
the right than someone inside.

142 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
143 Boumediene, 553 US at 828 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
144 Id. at 734 (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004)).
145 Id.
146 See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2006), invalidated by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)
147 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739 (2008). I should add two other criteria that could be relevant, but that the Court
FKRVHQRWWRLQFOXGHLQLWVKROGLQJ ZKHWKHUWKHGHWDLQHHZDVSLFNHGXSRQWKHEDWWOHÀHOGDQG ZKHWKHUWKHVWDWXV
of the detainee as an enemy combatant is controverted. $VQRWHGVRPHGHWDLQHHVZHUHSLFNHGXSRQWKHEDWWOHÀHOGDQG
some off. Id. The fact that some of the Boumediene detainees had colorable claims as noncombatants distinguishes them
from petitioners denied habeas in World War II cases. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Ex Parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
148 Id. at 766.
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This absence—this lack of a why—is telling.149 It happens, I think, because membership theory
pushes the law towards strict binaries. Either outsiders are not part of the social contract and get no
rights, or they are part of the social contract and get full rights.150 If one accepts that outsiders get
some rights, it is very hard to explain why they should not get every right.
Using the three-part test, the Court concluded that 1) the military tribunals gave detainees relatively little due process;151 *XDQWDQDPR%D\ZDVLQHYHU\UHVSHFWXQGHUWKHLQGHÀQLWHFRPSOHWH
control of the United States;152DQG *XDQWDQDPRZDVIDUIURPWKHEDWWOHÀHOGDQGWKHUHIRUHKDEHDV
review was not an undue obstacle.153
Taking these facts into account, the majority held that the petitioners had the right to petition
for habeas review.154 The nationality of the detainees, once mentioned, thus disappears.155 All of the
detainees are foreign nationals, but all have the right to petition for habeas. And the particular nature
of Guantanamo—the fact that it is, in every respect but technically, part of the United States—factors heavily.156 Under the terms of its lease, the United States has complete control over Guantanamo for as long as it wants; there are no other military, police or legal forces within the jurisdiction.157
As the Court noted, “in every practical sense Guantanamo is not abroad; it is within the constant
jurisdiction of the United States.”158
This conclusion—that Guantanamo is a de facto part of the United States—shines light on the
membership dynamic. One way to get membership is to be inside the United States. Knowing this,
the Bush Administration put the prisoners in Guantanamo, physically close but nominally outside
the United States.159 One way to read Boumediene is as a repudiation not of the decision to deny rights,
but of the choice to deny rights somewhere close to the United States (both literally and legally). If the
politics of the membership dynamic push the most questionable national security practices away
from the United States—if we are okay with the dark stuff, so long as we don’t have to see it—then
the Court was correcting the Bush administration not for going to the dark side, but for doing it too
close to home.
If this is true—if Boumediene endorses membership and not substance—then we will see that

149 The Boumediene majority relies on history and doctrine—not theory—to support its holding. Id. at 727-59. As
WKHPDMRULW\ZULWHV%RXPHGLHQHLVWKHÀUVWWLPHWKH&RXUWKDVKHOGWKDWDOLHQVLPSULVRQHGDEURDGKDYHDQ\ULJKWVXQGHU
the Constitution. See id. at 827 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Boumediene establishes that outsiders have access to habeas—a
constitutional right—even when the political branches, acting together in the name of national security, seek to deny that
right. Id. at 797.
150 See infra Part III.A.
151 553 U.S. at 767.
152 Id at 768-69.
153 Id. at 769-70.
154 Id. at 771.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 768-69.
157 Id. at 770.
158 Id at 69. (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 487 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
159 Id. at 828 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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endorsement going forward.160 The key doctrinal question is whether habeas will be limited to the
special—perhaps unique—circumstances of Guantanamo.161 Here the most telling case so far is Al
Maqaleh v. Gates.162 The Al Maqaleh petitioners alleged they were captured outside of and then transSRUWHGWR$IJKDQLVWDQ·V%DJUDP$LUÀHOG%DVH163 The D.C. Circuit held that these petitioners had
no constitutional right to petition for habeas.164 While rejecting the position that Boumediene applied
only to areas of de facto sovereignty—and hence probably only Guantanamo—the court held that
because Bagram is in an active theater of war, it would be impracticable to allow habeas.165 But the
court held out the possibility that the detainees’ might have the right to habeas—if they could prove
that the United States chose Bagram in order to “evade judicial review.”166 Seizing on this argument,
WKHGHWDLQHHVZLWKOHDYHIURPWKHGLVWULFWFRXUWKDYHÀOHGDPHQGHGSHWLWLRQVDUJXLQJWKDWWKH\ZHUH
detained in Bagram precisely for this reason.167
Assuming that the petitioners can prove this—and I don’t know if they can—the court’s
response will tell us whether Boumediene is about membership or substance. If the real gist of Boumediene is that the national security exception applies outside the United States, then the fact that the
United States is neither the de jure nor de facto sovereign of Afghanistan is enough to deny rights.
But, if Boumediene is about substance—that is, if it requires the government to have a good reason to
treat outsiders differently—then moving a detainee just to avoid court cannot justify denying habeas.
No matter what the cost of providing habeas in Bagram is, the cost cannot justify denying rights
when incurred for that reason.
III. MEMBERSHIP AS THEORY
*LYLQJIHZHUULJKWVWRQRQPHPEHUVZRXOGEHMXVWLÀHGLI WKHUHZHUHDJRRGUHDVRQWRGRVR,Q
this section I look at the reasons to treat outsiders differently, and argue that none justify the difference that we actually see. In order to make this argument I use the literature on extraterritoriality,
which directly engages membership as theory. In doing so, I adapt Gerald Neuman’s categorization
of the theories of rights for nonmembers.168
The existing literature on extraterritoriality fails to take into account that national security law
160 Lower courts have thus far not been sympathetic to habeas petitions from national security detainees held abroad.
See Developments, supra note 6, at 1260 .
161 For a good discussion of de facto sovereignty see generally Anthony J. Colangelo, “De facto Sovereignty”:
Boumediene and Beyond, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 623 (2009) (explaining how the concept of de facto sovereignty was
used in Boumediene and ways in which it may be used in future litigation involving noncitizens in other situations of
extraterritorial detention).
162 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
163 Id. at 87.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 96-98.
166 Id. at 98.
167 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 2011 WL 666883, at *1-2 (D.D.C. 2011). As of now, the court has not decided their
petitions.
168 See generally Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 Loy. L. Rev. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Neuman,
Closing].
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DQGPHPEHUVKLSODZDUHHYROYLQJWRJHWKHU0RUHRYHUWKH\LQÁXHQFHHDFKRWKHU%HFDXVHWKHUHLV
political incentive to direct national security only at outsiders, national security has become someWKLQJWKDWLVGHÀQHGE\PHPEHUVKLS,QRUGHUWRDYRLGWKLVWKHODZRI H[WUDWHUULWRULDOLW\VKRXOGDSSO\
the same way to national security as anything else. There should be no carve-out of the kind seen in
al-Aulaqi for national security actions abroad. In this section I make my case for this vision of equality, comparing it to other existing approaches.
A. Outsider as Nonperson: Membership
One approach to the rights of outsiders is simply not to recognize them—to treat them as
nonmembers. The membership approach treats places or individuals “as participating in a privileged
UHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOSURMHFWDQGWKHUHIRUHHQWLWOHGWRWKHEHQHÀWRI FRQVWLWXWLRQDO
provisions.”169 It derives from the social-contract model.170 Citizens and people within the United
States are parties to the contract.171 Nonmembers are not. Lacking a connection to the state, nonmembers have no rights against it.172 For states slow to internalize natural rights or external constraints on their power—think the United States—the membership approach is Hobbesian in that it
posits that states have no moral obligations to nonmembers.173
There is a lively historical debate about the membership approach and its role in U.S. history.174
169 Id. at 6-7.
170 Social-contract theories—of which there are many—view the state as the product of agreements between people
for mutual advantage. GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION, 6 (1996) [hereinafter NEUMAN, STRANGERS].
Individuals chose to leave nature and live under law in order to secure their rights. Id. at 9. Older scholars viewed these
rights as natural, meaning inherent in personhood and thus pre-existing the creation of the state. Id. at 10. Hobbes
did not see the state as a means to secure natural rights, but rather as the original source of rights. Id at 12. The state
is the “basic unit” of this contract—the parties to the contract are imagined as choosing principles for a state. Id. at 9.
The legitimacy of the state’s exercise of power, and its monopoly on violence, is understood as a matter of agreement;
because the parties to the social contract have—either actually or hypothetically—agreed to bind themselves to it, the
VWDWHLVMXVWLÀHGLQSXQLVKLQJWKHPXQGHUWKHODZ6DUDK+&OHYHODQGPowers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories,
and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 20 (2002) [hereinafter Cleveland,
Powers].
171 Neuman, Whose Constitution, supra note 2, at 917.
172 Id.
173 IdDW,QGHHGDFFRUGLQJWR+REEHVDEVHQWWUHDW\REOLJDWLRQVVWDWHVPD\ODZIXOO\LQÁLFWDQ\´HYLOOVRHYHUµRQ
nonmembers. Id. at 923 (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, 360 (C.B. MacPherson ed. 1985)). In practice, application
RI WKHPHPEHUVKLSDSSURDFKZRXOGWXUQRQWKHGHÀQLWLRQRI PHPEHUVKLS³DQGKHUHWKHUHDUHGLIIHUHQWDSSURDFKHV
Membership could extend only to citizens in U.S. territory, or to citizens wherever they are, or to all persons legally (or
perhaps illegally) inside U.S. territory, or to all persons inside the territory and to all citizens abroad. Additionally, instead
of construing membership as an all-or-nothing proposition, one could see it as a spectrum, in which those at the edges
RI WKHSROLW\JDLQULJKWVDVWKHLUDIÀOLDWLRQZLWKLWLQFUHDVHV7KLVDSSURDFKZDVVXJJHVWHGPRVWQRWRULRXVO\LQJohnson v.
Eisentrager, in which the Supreme Court stated that “The alien . . . has been accorded a generous and ascending scale of
rights as he increases his identity with our society.” 339 U.S. 763, 770. But whatever the criteria for membership is, under
any membership approach some people will fail this criteria and be excluded.
174 Compare J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 485 (2007) with
Cabranes supra note 6, Burnett supra note 6, and Cleveland, Embedded, supra note 6.
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Because my interest is in politics, not history, I will defer to other scholars on this point. My main
case against membership is simply a moral one. It seems wrong—deeply inconsistent with modern
principles—to take most of humanity and say they have no rights against U.S. power. Conceiving of
these aliens abroad as rightless, or possessing only those rights guaranteed by statute or treaty, leaves
some large and important swath of state action unbounded by the protections available to citizens.
Under a pure membership approach, nothing in the United States constitution would prevent the
CIA from arresting or even killing foreign nationals abroad for merely criticizing United States
foreign relations. It would allow a shadow-justice system in which foreign detainees were tried and
executed on Navy ships and foreign army bases, regardless of whether they were captured on the
EDWWOHÀHOGRUSUHVHQWHGHYHQDFRORUDEOHWKUHDWWRQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\175
I think this basic incompatibility with our other values is why the Supreme Court has not embraced a pure membership approach either in the War on Terror cases176 or other contexts.177 Indeed,
LWLVUDUHWRÀQGVRPHRQHZLOOLQJWRDGYRFDWHSXUHPHPEHUVKLS³WRVD\LWZRXOGEHRND\IRUWKH
United States to torture or kill aliens abroad because they simply have no rights. Instead, those who
argue for maximum executive power, such as John Yoo, have argued that the ability of the President
to treat aliens at his discretion derives from the Commander-in-Chief power, and not the simple fact
that aliens abroad never have constitutional rights.178
0RUHRYHULI ULJKWVXQGHUWKHVRFLDOFRQWUDFWGHULYHIURPYROXQWDU\DIÀOLDWLRQZLWKWKHVWDWH
(either the choice to be a citizen or to move into the territory) then aliens abroad should have no
constitutional rights when they are involuntarily transported to the United States.179 Someone cap175 See NEUMAN, STRANGERS, supra note 170, at 8 (“When the government acts outside the sphere of municipal law, it
HQWHUVDÀHOGZKHUHLWVDFWLRQVGRQRWLPSRVHREOLJDWLRQVµ 
176 See generally%RXPHGLHQHY%XVK86   ÀQGLQJWKDWWKH6XVSHQVLRQ&ODXVHDSSOLHVWRWKHGHWDLQHHV
held at Guantanamo Bay and that noncitizens detained there were thus entitled to raise habeas corpus petitions against
the U.S. government to challenge the legality of their detentions).
177 In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), the Court held that the government did not need to
comply with the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement when searching the house of a Mexican national in Mexico.
The respondent, Verdugo-Urquidez, was alleged to have smuggled drugs into the United States. Id. at 262. At the behest
RI 86RIÀFLDOVKHZDVDUUHVWHGLQ0H[LFRE\0H[LFDQSROLFHDQGWUDQVSRUWHGWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVIRUGHWHQWLRQId. U.S.
RIÀFHUVWKHQVHDUFKHGKLVKRXVHLQ0H[LFRZLWKRXWDZDUUDQWÀQGLQJHYLGHQFHWKDWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVODWHUZDQWHGWRXVH
in its prosecution of Verdugo-Urquidez in federal district court in the United States. Id. The Court held that the evidence
obtained in Mexico was admissible, but stopped short of holding that aliens abroad have no constitutional rights.
Rather, Rehnquist’s majority opinion, which was joined by four judges, held simply that the Fourth Amendment did not
apply in this case. Id. at 274-275. Justice Kennedy, who joined Rehnquist’s opinion while writing a separate concurrence
justifying the holding, concluded that aliens abroad can possess constitutional rights, depending on the process due in a
particular case. Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy explicitly rejected a membership approach by noting “that
the Government may act only as the Constitution authorizes, whether the actions in question are foreign or domestic.”
Id. at 277.
178 See John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1184 (2003). Yoo argues that the Commanderin-Chief clause vests “full control of the military operations of the United States to the President.” Id. at 1199. The
&RPPDQGHULQFKLHI SRZHUVWKXV´FRQVWLWXWH>V@DQDIÀUPDWLYHJUDQWRI DXWKRULW\WRWKH3UHVLGHQWWR¶GLVSRVHRI WKH
liberty’ of prisoners of war.” Id. at 1221.
179 NEUMAN, STRANGERS, supra note 170, at 8.
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tured abroad and dragged to the United States does not consent to that exercise of power, even in
a hypothetical sense.180 But aliens captured abroad do have procedural rights—the right to an attorney, for instance—when tried in U.S. courts. We are not comfortable with the consequences of pure
membership when we have to confront them.181 This is why we try to push them away—to keep
military detainees outside the United States, and to render suspects to other countries for torture.
B. Outsider as Enemy
The outsider-as-enemy theory posits that loyalty and nationality run together. The theory suggests that since foreign nationals are loyal to different states, they do not have rights against the
United States. The enemy theory explains older statutes like the Enemy Alien Act, which authorizes
the removal and detention of foreign nationals of states at war with the United States.182 It is consistent with the original constitutional vision of war as a battle between states, formalized by Congressional declaration.183 Foreign nationals are loyal to their states, and when we are at war with a state,
its foreign nationals are our enemies. As the Court explained about World War II detainees:184
It is war that exposes the relative vulnerability of the alien’s status . . . disabilities this
country lays upon the alien who becomes also an enemy are imposed temporarily as
an incident of war and not as an incident of alienage . . . the alien enemy is bound by
an allegiance which commits him to lose no opportunity to forward the cause of our
enemy; hence the United States, assuming him to be faithful to his allegiance, regards
him as part of the enemy resources.
The enemy theory, though, does not explain why outsiders receive fewer rights in post-9/11
national security practice. The era of declared wars is long gone; we now live in an era of unilateral Executive action and Congressional approval that is less than the previously requisite formal

180 See id. Nor can the anti-subordination principle justify granting rights to someone who is in no way part of the
community that she would be subordinated to.
181 There is an instrumental argument for granting aliens captured abroad procedural rights in U.S. courts without
recognizing that aliens abroad have rights generally: that federal courts should not get into the habit of conducting trials
without rights, lest that color their treatment of citizens. But if we accept this premise—that government bodies used
to acting without constraint will do so even when acting against rights-bearers—then the instrumental argument pushes
much more strongly in favor of requiring bodies that exercise extraterritorial authority to observe rights. This is because
as the risk of terrorist attacks causing harm in the United States grows, so does the risk that these bodies will have an
expanded domestic mandate. What happens, in other words, if there is another big attack, and the CIA or military is
GHSOR\HGGRPHVWLFDOO\" 7KLVZRXOGUHTXLUHPRGLÀFDWLRQRI H[LVWLQJODZSee, e.g., Exec. Order 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200,
200 (1982)). If that attack comes—if a dirty bomb goes off in New York—wouldn’t it be better if the agencies that
responded were used to observing some sort of human rights?
182 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2006).
183 U.S. CONST. ART. I § 8.
184 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950).
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declaration of war.185 Moreover, our enemies in the War on Terror are not states, but transnational
organizations like al Qaeda.186 The War on Terror has been waged against citizens of allied states.187
Even if we accept that citizenship is relevant in a war against a non-state organization, the enemy
theory does not explain differential treatment based on territoriality. Al-Aulaqi is dead despite being
an American citizen.188 If his citizenship somehow denoted his loyalty to the United States, then his
rights should not have changed with his location.
7KHOHJDOMXVWLÀFDWLRQIRUWKHZDURQWHUURUKLQJHGRQWKHFRQWLQXLW\EHWZHHQGHFODUHGZDUDQG
war against non-state actors. Anything a President could do to the Nazis, he could also do to al
Qaeda, or so the argument goes.189 Taking this argument at face value, though, everything about it
pushes away from membership, and towardsVXEVWDQFH,I ZHDUHÀJKWLQJRUJDQL]DWLRQVWKDWXVHFLWLzens from many nations and that operate in different countries, then nationality and territory should
matter less.
It is worth taking a moment here to think about the change from declared wars between states
to the War on Terror The shift is not caused by al Qaeda, or any other enemy. Rather the change is
caused by new technology. New weapons—predator drones, dirty bombs, poisonous gases—have
made it easier to kill. The Internet also makes it easier to cause harm.190
This new technology has made threat more diffuse. It comes from more people and places—not
just states, but also small groups of people, and even individuals. And because threat is more diffuse,
it is also less territorial. People can cause mass harm now without needing to control much territory.
They can launch a devastating attack while living in the targeted country.
Consider these new threats. There is the risk of chemical attack, like the sarin gas used on the
Tokyo subway by Aum Shinrikyo, a religious cult,191 or a biological attack, like anthrax sent through
WKHPDLO7KHDQWKUD[PDLOHUPLJKWKDYHEHHQDVFLHQWLVWZLWKDFFHVVWR86ZHDSRQVV\VWHPV³RIÀ-

185 See generally6DQIRUG/HYLQVRQ -DFN0%DONLQConstitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 1789, 1821-36 (2010).
186 See, e.g.WKH$XWKRUL]DWLRQIRU8VHRI 0LOLWDU\)RUFH6WDWFRGLÀHGDWQRWHIROORZLQJU.S.C. §1541
(2006) (authorizing the Executive to use force against the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks and associated forces).
187 See, e.g., Rachel Bronson, Rethinking Religion: The Legacy of the U.S.-Saudi Relationship, 28:4 WASH. Q. 121, 121 (2005)
H[SODLQLQJWKDWÀIWHHQRI WKHQLQHWHHQKLMDFNHUVZHUH6DXGL$UDELDQQDWLRQDOV 
188 Supra Part II.A.
189 See, e.g$XWKRUL]DWLRQIRU8VHRI 0LOLWDU\)RUFH6WDWFRGLÀHGDWQRWHIROORZLQJU.S.C. §1541 (2006).
The President reads the AUMF to include the right to detain those “who were part of, or substantially supported,
Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners.” Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at
Guantanamo Bay at 2, In re: Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08-442, (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009).
190 The Internet enables direct attacks on infrastructure—power grids and the like—but also allows people to share
information, coordinate attacks over long distances, and encrypt communications.
191 Twelve people died. See Matthew E. Brown, Reconsidering the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Toward State
Regionalization in Bioterrorism Response, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 95, 96 (2005). Another biological attack—less famous, but
also frightening—occurred when the Rajneeshee cult in Oregon deliberately infected over 750 people with salmonella by
sprinkling it on salad bars. See id. at 102.
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cials are still not certain.192 If so, he or she managed to terrify the United States using its own facilities.193
There is also the threat of a nonstate nuclear attack. This risk is very low, but it is not zero.194
The international weapons market has become more commoditized.195 While it is probably true that
only a state (or a state-sponsored group) can build a nuclear weapon, it is not entirely clear that statecreated nuclear weapons, and the ability to use them, will never fall into the hands of violent nonstate actors.196
Beyond weapons proliferation, the simple fact of globalization changes the threat. Countries are
now linked in new ways by electric grids, transportation technology, and the Internet. This infrastructure also presents new threats. The best examples are the 9/11 attacks, in which planes, not
weapons, were used. Or rather, planes were used as weapons.
The state is therefore “losing its monopoly over the means of mass destruction.”197 As Bruce
Ackerman wrote:
The root of our problem is not . . . any ideology, but the free market in death. If the
Middle East were . . . transformed into a[n] . . . oasis of peace and democracy, fringe
JURXSVIURPRWKHUSODFHVZRXOGULVHWRÀOOWKHJDS,I DWLQ\EDQGRI H[WUHPLVWV
blasted the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, others will want to detonate suitcase
A-bombs as they become available.198
These changes herald not only a shift away from war as a contest between states, but also as a
shift away from war as a territorial phenomenon. In a conventionally waged war, the point was to
control territory—to establish a local monopoly on the use of force (which, after all, is what governments do, according to Locke).199 This is what World War II looked like. But if technology is changing so that controlling territory is less correlated with preventing mass harm—if chemical weapons
can be made in basements as well as state laboratories,200—then national security will focus less on
controlling territory. Imagine a set of threats to the United States, some real and some perceived,
whose response is not control of enemy territory but rather a targeted used of force. Sometimes
192 Pierre Thomas, et al., “Anthrax Scientist Kills Himself as FBI Closes In,” ABCNews (Aug. 1, 2008), http://abcnews.
go.com/TheLaw/story?id=5494971 (last visited November 12, 2011) [hereinafter Thomas, “Anthrax Suspect.”].
193 There is some evidence that the anthrax attacker was a U.S. employee. See id. This threat—of states losing control
RI WKHPHDQVRI PDVVGHVWUXFWLRQ³LVRQHRI WKHPRVWDFXWHSRVHGLQERUGHUOHVVFRQÁLFWV,QGHHG$4.DKQWKH
3DNLVWDQLVFLHQWLVWZKRWUDIÀFNHGQXFOHDUZHDSRQVWHFKQRORJ\WR1RUWK.RUHDDQG/LE\DPD\KDYHDFWHGZLWKRXW
Pakistan’s consent. See PHILLIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT at 73-80 (2008) (hereinafter BOBBITT, TERROR).
194 BOBBITT, TERROR, 98-124.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Bruce Ackerman, Terrorism and the Constitutional Order, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 475, 478 (2006).
198 Id.
199 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 111 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale
Univ. Press 2003) (1689).
200 See BOBBITT, TERROR, supra note 193 at 189-206.
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the threat will come from inside the United States and sometimes from outside. But the hallmark of
these threats will be the government claim that the stakes are as high as in territorial war—thousands
(or more) will die if the government does not respond.
Every aspect of this change—the rise in threat from non-state actors, the decreased relevance of
territoriality—pushes away from membership. If we are enemies with al Qaeda, then membership
in al Qaeda, and not foreign citizenship, should make one subject to the national security exception.
Jose Padilla, the alleged al Qaeda member and U.S. citizen, should have been shipped to Guantanamo.201 And if the relevance of territoriality is diminished—if someone inside the United States
can now cause as much damage as a foreign army, and the United States can now target individuals
anywhere in the world with missiles—then it should matter less whether people are inside or outside
the country.
C. Universalism
Universalism is the view that rights should “be interpreted as applicable to every person and at
every place.”202 This does not mean that location should never be taken into account. Under a uniYHUVDOLVWDSSURDFKWKHGLIÀFXOWLHVRI HQIRUFLQJULJKWVRXWVLGHRI WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVFDQEHWDNHQLQWR
account, but only in the same manner as pragmatic limitations inside the country.203
The fundamental proposition underlying universalism is simple. If we believe that human rights
are inherent in the person, then it would be odd for these rights to disappear because of place.
Indeed, it seems absurd that essential human freedoms should differ depending on where they are
enforced.
The difference between universalism and the equality view that I endorse is that universalism
suggests some minimal standard of treatment due all people, while equality demands only that
people be treated the same wherever they are. In practice, universalism—which demands a set of
minimal rights that applies to everyone everywhere—is tied to international law. It is only through
a system of law that transcends state-based guarantees that universal minimums can be established.
International humanitarian law and international human-rights law are both expressions of universal
visions.
Both the theory and doctrine of universalism are well worked out.204 But the politics are not.
The world is still looking for a way to enforce universal norms against noncompliant states, includ201 See Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1062-64 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
202 Neuman, Whose Constitution, supra note 2, at 916.
203 Id. Kal Raustiala has similarly expressed the view that there is no “inherent spatial dimension to the law.” Raustiala,
Geography, supra note 6, at 2550 (emphasis added). I should add that Raustiala is not a universalist. His approach does
“not demand that all rules apply identically on all places.” Id. at 2551. Instead, spatial distinctions apply when the legal
WH[WRUUHDVRQFOHDUO\LQGLFDWHWKDWWKH\VKRXOGRULI WKHUXOH·VHIIHFWZRXOGRWKHUZLVHEHQXOOLÀHGRUYLRODWHLQWHUQDWLRQDO
comity. Id. In application, this approach would require a right-by-right inquiry into the appropriateness of extraterritorial
application, but the party advocating for territorial limitations would bear the burden of proving their relevance. In this
regard, Raustiala’s approach resembles that global due-process approach, except that it would shift the burden to make
extraterritorial possession of rights the default.
204 See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE at 228-68 (2006).
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ing the United States.205 Universalism is thus a theory without an institutional structure to enforce it.
In this context, we can consider calls for universalism, instantiated by the many arguments that U.S.
courts should apply international humanitarian law to the war on terror, as another form of poliWLFV,QWKDWOLJKWWKHTXHVWLRQLVQRWWKHLUFRUUHFWQHVVEXWWKHLUHIÀFDF\³ZKHWKHUWKH\ZLOOJHWWKH
results they want.
Equality presents itself as an alternative not because it is normatively better, but because it is
the theory that is most likely to sway U.S. courts—the branch that is, in the near term, most likely to
restrict the war power.
D. Global Due Process
Under the global-due-process approach, the government must observe “fundamental” rights
when it acts abroad, but only when their application would not be “impracticable and anomalous.”206
Global due process is a loose sort of pragmatism that recognizes the rights of aliens abroad when
those rights seem important and the cost of recognizing them not unduly substantial.207
While there is a role for pragmatism in determining the rights of aliens abroad, the global-due
process approach overemphasizes pragmatism by tying the existence of the right to pragmatic considerations. It would be better to recognize that aliens abroad always have rights against U.S. power, but
that the possibility of enforcing those rights can be limited by pragmatic considerations in the same
way that they can limit the possibility of enforcing rights at home. Just as Fourth Amendment rights
may be waived when exigencies prevent obtaining a warrant,208 so might the warrant requirement be
ZDLYHGEHFDXVHRI WKHGLIÀFXOW\RI ÀQGLQJDIRUHLJQPDJLVWUDWHZKHQDFWLQJDEURDG209 This differs
from the view that the Fourth Amendment simply does not apply to aliens or people abroad because
it is not “fundamental.”

205 See infra Part IV.B.
206 Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology After Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2073,
2076 (2005) [hereinafter Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights].
207 The idea that aliens abroad can enforce only their fundamental rights is derived from ideas contained in the
Insular Cases, in which the courts considered rights of people in the United States territories acquired in the Spanish
American War. See generally Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). The Insular Cases therefore do not concern the
rights of aliens abroad, because the United States was sovereign over the territories in question, and some of the cases
concerned citizens. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 308 (1922). Nevertheless, they introduced the idea that there is
some class of people who are entitled to only fundamental rights. Applying this approach, the Supreme Court concluded
that the right to jury trial was not fundamental. See Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 148-49 (1904); Balzac v. Porto
Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 309-311 (1922). But later cases considering territorial possessions have extended other rights,
including Due Process and Equal Protection Rights. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668 n.5
(1974)(extending the constitutional right of due process to Puerto Rico); Examining Bd. of Eng’rs v. Otero, 426 U.S.
572, 600 (1976) (holding that a Puerto Rican law providing that only citizens could be engineers was unconstitutional). It
is probably unwise to extrapolate too much from these cases, as each territory has a different relationship to the United
States.
208 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978).
209 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 279 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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E. Mutuality of Obligation
Developed by Professor Neuman, the mutuality of obligation approach recognizes the rights
of aliens abroad when they are subjected to U.S. power for violating existing law.210 It is theoretically
grounded in the view that “constitutional rights and limitations [are] necessary to justify the exercise
of governing power.”211 The U.S. must therefore recognize rights whenever there is an “assertion of
an obligation to obey U.S. law.”212
The mutuality approach—and others that rely on it213³KDYHWKHEHQHÀWRI EHLQJWKHRUHWLFDOO\
continuous with social-contract theory. They are also more doctrinally consistent with U.S. law in
that they recognize that the United States has never, before Boumediene, recognized the rights of
aliens abroad against a claimed use of the war power. We can also take the mutuality approach,
which Neuman has defended,214WREHDFRQFHVVLRQWRWKHSROLWLFDOGLIÀFXOW\RI VHFXULQJULJKWVIRU
outsiders. The mutuality approach recognizes the rights of outsiders any time a claim is made under
law. Given the increasing frequency of laws that have extra territorial application—under, for instance, environmental215 and antitrust216 law—recognition of rights for outsiders under claims of law
would accomplish a lot.
7KHGLIÀFXOW\ZLWKWKHPXWXDOLW\DSSURDFKLVLWVGHÀQLWLRQRI ´ODZµ7KLVGHÀQLWLRQVHHPVLQtended to exclude extraterritorial use of force grounded in the war power. In the national security
context, rights claims are often asserted against Executive action. The military may arrest someone
in Bosnia and imprison him in Bagram, or the CIA could admit that it is trying to kill someone in
<HPHQ7KHMXVWLÀFDWLRQIRUXVLQJIRUFHXQGHUWKHZDUSRZHULVWKDWWKHWDUJHWLVDQHQHP\QRWWKDW
he broke the law. So rights are not available against these actions.
This is problematic in the same way that the membership approach is. If the political branches
choose to target outsiders under the national security power, the targets have no rights. With insiders, though, the political branches are bound to honor the Constitution, even if they choose not

210 Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights, supra note 206, at 2077.
211 Neuman, Closing, supra note 168, at 7.
212 Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights, supra note 206, at 2077.
213 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Wilson, The War on Terrorism and “The Water’s Edge”: Sovereignty, “Territorial Jurisdiction,” and the
Reach of the U.S. Constitution in the Guantanamo Detainee Litigation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 165 (2006); David R. Chludzinski, A
Most Certain Tragedy, but Reason Enough to Side-Step the Constitution and Values of the United States?, 23 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV.
227, 246 (2004).
214 Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights, supra note 206, at 2076-77.
215 See generally Randall S. Abate, Dawn of a New Era in the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Environmental Statutes: A
Proposal for an Integrated Judicial Standard Based on the Continuum of Context, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 87 (2006).
216 See generally-RKQ0&RQQRU 'DUUHQ%XVKHow to Block Cartel Formation and Price Fixing: Using Extraterritorial
Application of the Antitrust Laws as a Deterrence Mechanism, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 813 (2008).
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to claim that the suspects violated the law.217 If, for instance, the military picks up a citizen in the
8QLWHG6WDWHVDQGGHWDLQVKLPRUKHULQGHÀQLWHO\WKHVXVSHFWQHHGQRWSURYHWKDWKHLVEHLQJKHOGRQ
a claim of violation of law. The Constitution applies presumptively.218
The mutuality approach thus gives the political branches discretion over the national security exception for outsiders, but not insiders. Like membership, then, the mutuality approach risks creating
a national security exception that is directed only at outsiders.219
If mutuality220 presents a trade, it is one that progressives should not take. Conceding that
the value of securing rights against claims under the law is high, the cost of allowing the political
branches free reign when claiming use of the war power abroad is higher. In part, this is because
mutuality presumably envisions that international law will restrain extraterritorial use of the U.S. war
power, when for the most part it has not.221 But the bigger problem with creating a carve-out for the
United States when it claims the war power abroad is that we don’t really know what that power is.
The mutuality approach, in other words, would make sense if we knew the limits of the war
power. But we do not. The national security exception is, in a deep sense, still up for grabs, even
when applied to citizens at home. To the question of whether the Executive can detain a U.S. citizen captured in the U.S. under the AUMF, the answer is maybe.222 To say that the Executive can do
abroad what it can’t do at home is to assume that we know what it can do at home. But we do not.
The laws of extraterritoriality and national security are not just evolving, but coevolving. Treatments of one that don’t deal with the other are incomplete. In the real world, membership and
national security come bundled. The question in Boumediene was whether habeas was available to alien
 ,QSUDFWLFHWKLVGHÀQLWLRQPD\KDYHIX]]\ERXQGDULHV1HXPDQKDVDUJXHGWKDWWKH*XDQWDQDPRGHWDLQHHVKDYH
constitutional rights, both because Guantanamo is entirely controlled by the United States, Neuman, Closing, supra note
168 at 39-40, and because they are entitled to it under the doctrinally prevalent global due-process approach. Id. at 44-51.
But he has not argued that they have rights under a mutuality approach.
218 This does not mean that the citizen will win his release—that is still an open question—but rights would not turn
on whether the Executive claimed that the detainee violated law. Instead it would turn on the substantive scope of the
national security power.
219 One can imagine a system in which courts second-guessed the Executive decision not to justify the use of power
by claiming that the subject of that power violated a law. But that system would inevitably devolve into one like the
system I am proposing. If courts reviewed executive detention to determine whether the Executive was empowered to
KROGDSDUWLFXODUGHWDLQHHDQGGHWHQWLRQZLWKRXWFKDUJLQJDYLRODWLRQRI ODZZDVRQO\MXVWLÀHGXQGHUWKHQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\
SRZHUWKHQFRXUWVZRXOGQHHGWRGHYHORSDVXEVWDQWLYHGHÀQLWLRQRI QDWLRQDOVHFXULW\
220 In the same vein, Judge José A. Cabranes has argued that the availability of extraterritorial criminal-procedure
rights should be tied to: “(1) whether the power exercised by the government is one that can only be exercised abroad;
(2) the extent of the connection to the United States of those acted upon overseas; (3) whether the challenged
government action presents a risk of irreparable injustice; (4) the practical limitations on enforcing the constitutional
provision in question; and (5) the absence of any categorical rule to determine whether a particular provision of the
Constitution should have extraterritorial force.” Cabranes, supra note 6, at 1698. One of the powers that “can only be
exercised abroad” is the war power. Id. at 1700-1701. This approach is troubling in the same way that mutuality is: it
creates too much judicial deference to use of the war power abroad.
221 See infra Part IV.B.
222 See %REE\&KHVQH\ %HQMDPLQ:LWWHVResolving Ambiguities? Yes. Dramatically Expanding Existing Detention Authority?
No., LAWFARE (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/09/resolving-ambiguities-yes-dramatically-expandingexisting-detention-authority-no/.
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enemy combatants captured and detained abroad.223 Congress, when passing a law justifying national
security practices, can choose to target only aliens. The Executive, when exercising its considerable
discretion, can choose to treat outsiders differently. The courts can choose to use other doctrines—
like the political-question doctrine—as proxies for territoriality. And so on. In each of these cases,
membership presents an outDZD\WRDYRLGGHÀQLQJQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\
F. Equality
Courts should require the political branches to treat outsiders equally against the national security power. While there may be pragmatic reasons to treat outsiders differently—such as the inability
to use normal criminal enforcement—the fact that someone is an alien or abroad should not, by
itself, justify different treatment.
This is political-process argument. Political-process arguments are familiar in the domestic
constitutional context. They posit that judicial review should be deployed against “systemic biases
in legislative decision making rather than against the outputs of a properly functioning political
system.”224 One kind of bias justifying heightened judicial scrutiny is “‘prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities.”225
This kind of discrimination signals problems with policy. A discriminatory law must be wrong
to at least one party. If a law making it illegal to operate a laundry in a wooden building is only
enforced against Chinese people, and not whites,226 then it is suspect. If the law is a good one—if,
VD\LWDFWXDOO\SUHYHQWVÀUHV³WKHQLWVKRXOGEHHQIRUFHGDJDLQVWHYHU\RQH,I LWLVEDG³LI LWLVRQO\
a pretext to target an unpopular group—then it should not have been passed at all. Either way, the
differential treatment tells us something is wrong.
Similarly, we are either militarily detaining too many outsiders or too few insiders. The same goes
for extraordinary rendition, preventive nonmilitary detention, and targeted killing. We either do it
too little at home, or too much abroad. If this difference were explained by pragmatic reasons—if
it were impossible to avoid national security measures against every outsider subject to the U.S.
national security power—then there would be less cause for suspicion. But this is not the case. The
United States had a legal pathway to go after Boumediene and his cohorts.227 That pathway failed,
so the country used national security measures. Six years later, when Boumediene made it out of the
national security system, it became apparent that there was not a lot of evidence against him.228 If he
had been a U.S. citizen inside the United States, he would not have had to suffer for so long. MoreRYHUWKHÁDZVRI WKHFRXQWU\·VPLOLWDU\GHWHQWLRQV\VWHPZRXOGKDYHEHFRPHFOHDUHUVRRQHU
3ROLWLFDOSURFHVVWKHRU\KDVLWVÁDZV6XVSLFLRQRI GLVFULPLQDWLRQDJDLQVWRQO\GLVFUHWHDQGLQVX223 See supra Part II.E.
224 Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 747 (1991); See also JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
225 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
226 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
227 See supra Part II.E.
228 Id.
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lar minorities misses discrimination against other groups, such as women (who are not minorities).229
$FRPPLWPHQWWRÀJKWLQJUDFLVPVH[LVPDQGRWKHUW\SHVRI LQYLGLRXVGLVFULPLQDWLRQUHTXLUHVVRPH
substantive commitment.230
I take these critiques to be correct. To the extent that invidious racial or religious discrimination
infects national security law—say, in discriminatory Executive targeting of Arab or Islamic men231—
my approach will not solve it. That said, a policy-perfecting approach can solve the problem of
access to courts.
From a simple equity standpoint, this would be a good thing. It does not discount the problems
of our criminal justice system to suggest that outsiders would do better in court than at the mercy
of the political branches. The wrongfully imprisoned Al-Kidd, released after sixteen days, was better
off than el-Masri, who was tortured and dumped on a hillside.
Equality is also the right policy response to the technological shifts that are pulling us from territorial war. When controlling territory is less linked to threat, legal status should be less linked to territory. If threat no longer comes just from enemy states, then nationality should matter less. There is
a case that national security practices should change in response to new technologies (although I do
not think this means we need to give up on civil liberties). The challenge is to fashion responses to
new threats that protect rights while allowing the government to respond to the increased chance of
mass harm. But with the partial exception of the PATRIOT Act, this has not happened.232 Instead,
we have decided to give few rights to outsiders without reconsidering the national security regime at
home.
Equity offers to break this pattern. But for liberals (and I am one), equality is a risk. Leveling
rights between outsiders and insiders could cause a leveling up for outsiders, but it also might level
insiders down. Because my aim is to preserve (and limit) the war power not by unleashing it only
DJDLQVWDOLHQVDEURDGEXWE\ÀQGLQJLWVVXEVWDQWLYHFRQWRXUV,DPZLOOLQJWRFRQWHPSODWHVRPHH[panded use of the war power at home. This could be consistent with expanded executive power, although need not be. The most egalitarian vision of national security law yet offered was in the early
days of the Bush Administration, when it proposed that the Constitution gave the Executive unilat-

229 “Long after discrete and insular minorities have gained strong representation at the pluralist bargaining table,
WKHUHZLOOUHPDLQPDQ\RWKHUJURXSVZKRIDLOWRDFKLHYHLQÁXHQFHUHPRWHO\SURSRUWLRQDWHWRWKHLUQXPEHUVJURXSV
that are discrete and diffuse (like women), or anonymous and somewhat insular (like homosexuals), or both diffuse
and anonymous (like the victims of poverty).” Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713,
742 (1985).
230 “[T[here are constitutional values in our scheme of government even more fundamental than perfected
pluralism—most notably, those that bar prejudice against racial and religious minorities.” Id. at 746; see also Laurence H.
Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1076-77 (1980).
231 See supra Part II.D.
 86$3$75,27$&7RI 3XE/1R6WDW  FRGLÀHGDW86&D
(2006).
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eral authority when using the Commander-in-Chief power.233 Under the unitary-executive theory, the
President could suspend the rights of citizens as well as aliens.234
This vision has not prevailed. Nor do I think it will. My hope is that, when faced with a choice
between more or fewer rights, the public will choose the former. The more courts are empowered to
look at Executive action abroad, the more it will become apparent that rights-based approaches are
consistent with safety. But I could be wrong. That said, I do not see a better way forward.
IV. MEMBERSHIP AND SUBSTANCE
We have not developed a substantive vision of national security—one tied to the threat posed
DQGDSSURSULDWHUHVSRQVHV7KLVLVQRWWRVD\WKDWZHKDYHQRGHÀQLWLRQRI QDWLRQDOVHFXULW\WKHUH
DUHWZR7KHÀUVWLVEDVHGRQ&RQJUHVVLRQDODXWKRUL]DWLRQWKHVHFRQGRQLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ1HLWKHU
VXEVWDQWLYHO\GHÀQHVWKH86QDWLRQDOVHFXULW\H[FHSWLRQ&RQJUHVVLRQDODXWKRUL]DWLRQGRHVFRQVWUDLQ
U.S. action, but, as I argue, it is not substantive. And international law, while substantive, does not
GHÀQHWKHQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\H[FHSWLRQ
A. Congressional Authorization Is Not Substantive
7RWKHH[WHQWWKDWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVKDVKDGDQRSHUDWLYHGHÀQLWLRQRI QDWLRQDOVHFXULW\LWLV
based on Congressional authorization. This practice is part of our constitutional architecture. Article
I § 8 gives Congress the power to declare war.235 This assignment of power works with the allocation
of the Commander-in-Chief power, to the President236 to split the war power between branches.
The main Congressional authority for post-9/11 national security practices is the Authorization
for Use of Military Force (AUMF).237 The AUMF authorizes the President to use “all necessary and
appropriate force” against those who “planned, authorized, committed” the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as
well as those who “aided or . . . harbored” the attackers.238 Courts, for the most part, have accepted

233 See The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations
Supporting Them, 2001 WL (OLC) 34726560, at *19 (Sept. 25, 2001) (“Military actions need not be limited to
those individuals, groups, or states that participated in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon: the
Constitution vests the President with the power to strike terrorist groups or organizations that cannot be demonstrably
linked to the September 11 incidents, but that, nonetheless, pose a similar threat to the security of the United States and
the lives of its people, whether at home or overseas. . . . These decisions, under our Constitution, are for the President
alone to make.”).
234 See generally id.
235 U.S. CONST. Art. I § 8.
236 U.S. CONST. Art. II § 2.
237 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) [hereinafter AUMF].
The President reads the AUMF to include the right to detain those “who were part of, or substantially supported,
Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners.” Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at
Guantanamo Bay at 2, In re: Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08-442, (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009).
238 AUMF, 115 Stat. at 224.
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WKH$80)DVDMXVWLÀFDWLRQIRUQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\DFWLRQ239 The doctrinal question of whether miliWDU\GHWHQWLRQLVMXVWLÀHGWKXVWXUQVLQSUDFWLFHRQZKHWKHUWKHGHWDLQHHKDVWKHUHODWLRQVKLSWRWKH
9/11 terrorists required by the AUMF.240 The same may be true with targeted killing.241
While the AUMF does provide some justiciable constraint on the Executive, these constraints
are not substantive. The AUMF does not tell us what the Executive can or cannot do. It merely approves “all necessary and appropriate force.”242 We can take this to mean that Congress has granted
the Executive all the power Congress itself has. This delegation is constitutional,243 but it would be
more appropriate if Congress actually weighed in itself.
0RUHDWLVVXHWKH$80)GRHVQRWH[SODLQZKDWNLQGRI WKUHDWMXVWLÀHVQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\WUHDWment. Rather, it targets a particular set of enemies: the 9/11 attackers and those connected to
them.244 It is as if Congress authorized a particular topic of dubious constitutionality—say, warrantless wiretaps—against one drug cartel and no others. This does not tell us what can be done
and why. It only tells us who we can do it to—not in general, forward-looking terms, but only in
response to past attack.
This approach—of picking an enemy, instead of a threat—makes sense if we think of post9/11 practices as war. Wars are waged against enemies. Congress could declare war against Germany,
which would authorize military trial and detention of German enemy combatants.245 Yet what is now
occurring is not precisely war. Instead, we have the “war on terror,” a new hybrid. Unlike war, we
do not know what the “war on terror” is. No constitutional framer asked whether the United States
could use a drone to kill a suspected terrorist, who happens to be a U.S. citizen living in an allied
country (but in a region that is not under allied control).246 Even military detention—a traditional incident of the war power247—has not traditionally been applied to detainees who are 1) plausibly not
DIÀOLDWHGZLWKWKHHQHP\DWDOO FDSWXUHGRII WKHEDWWOHÀHOG LQWKHDEVHQFHRI DGHFODUHGZDU 
DQGWKHUHIRUHSRWHQWLDOO\VXEMHFWWRLQGHÀQLWHGHWHQWLRQEHFDXVHWKH´ZDUµWKH\DUHDOOHJHGO\SDUWRI 
will never end.248
%\FHGLQJIXOOGLVFUHWLRQWRWKHH[HFXWLYH&RQJUHVVKDVGHFLGHGQRWWRGHÀQHWKHZDURQWHU249
ror. The Executive—the body charged with enforcing the law, not making it—is constitutionally
FRQVWUDLQHGIURPGHÀQLQJLW,WLVWKLVERG\WKDWQHHGVWREHUHVWUDLQHG
239 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
240 See, e.g., Al Alwi v. Obama, No. 09–5125, 2011 WL 2937134, at *10 (D.C. Cir. July 22, 2011).
241 See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2010); see also Bobby Chesney, The AQ-AQAP Distinction,
State Secrets, and the Al-Aulaki Suit, LAWFARE (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/10/the-aq-aqapdistinction-state-secrets-and-the-al-aulaki-suit/.
242 AUMF., 115 Stat. at 224.
243 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517-25.
244 See AUMF, 115 Stat. at 224..
245 See generally Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
246 See supra Part II.A.
247 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517-25 .
248 This question is not hypothetical—it was the position of Boumediene. See supra Part II.E.
249 Both the AUMF and Military Commissions Act, as I have argued, are not limits on Executive Power but rather
endorsements of them. See supra Part II.B.
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This leaves the judiciary to police the war power. We should not be surprised that it has. There
has to be some end to what the political branches can do in the name of war. The President cannot
kill U.S. citizens on U.S. soil without due process on mere allegations of terrorism.250 Or, to give a
more far-fetched hypo, I do not think the President can constitutionally kill people for opposing the
war.251
I do not think this point is doctrinally controversial.2527KH&RXUWKDVORQJGHÀQHGWKHRXWHUOLPit of the war power.253 This is consistent with its basic function. The Constitution limits the power
of each branch of the government. The Court interprets the Constitution. This means, for instance,
deciding what “commerce” is.254 The Court will, and should, also decide what “war” is.255 It would be
strange if it did otherwise.
With Congress having dropped out of the debate, and the Supreme Court left to police the outer edges of the war power, the country is in a strange position. A few large cases—notably, Hamdi
and Boumediene—raise foundational questions, but neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has
stepped in to answer them. This has left the issue to the lower courts. As Benjamin Wittes, Bobby
Chesney, and Rabea Benhalim have noted:
This peculiar delegation of a major legislative project to the federal courts arose because of the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision that the courts have jurisdiction to hear
*XDQWiQDPR KDEHDV FDVHV     >7@KH MXVWLFHV    UHIXVHG WR GHÀQH WKH FRQWRXUV
of either the government’s detention authority or the procedures associated with the
challenges it authorized. . . . Combined with the passivity of the political branches in
WKHZDNHRI WKHKLJKFRXUW·VGHFLVLRQWKLVPRYHSODFHGDQDVWRQLVKLQJUDIWRI GLIÀFXOW
questions in the hands of the federal district court judges in Washington and the appellate judges who review their work.256
BoumedieneKDVLQIDFWEHHQVRGLIÀFXOWWRLPSOHPHQWWKDWVHYHUDOMXGJHVKDYHWDNHQWKHXQXVXDO

250 See supra Part II.A.
251 C.f., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-27 (1971) (holding that the First Amendment grants the right to criticize
the draft even using offensive language). I am using a slippery-slope argument here—always a dubious tactic—but in
response to an equally dubious premise: that the war power has no justiciable limit.
252 The Bush Administration disagreed. See The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations
Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them, 2001 WL (OLC) 34726560, at *19 (Sept. 25, 2001).
253 See, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525-39 (2004).
254 U.S. CONST. Art. I § 8.
255 Id.; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-78 (1803).
256 RABEA BENHALIM ET. AL., THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION: THE GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING 1
available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney.aspx.
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step of asking—both in opinions257 and while off the bench258—for more guidance. But I do not
WKLQNWKHVHUHTXHVWVZLOOEHDQVZHUHG7KHUHLVSUHVVXUHWRÀJKWWHUURULVPDQGWRSURWHFWWKHQDWLRQ
The political branches respond to this pressure by targeting outsiders. The risks of using those practices—of beating, killing or imprisoning without trial— fall mostly on aliens and people outside the
country, who have little or no power to push back. The Supreme Court, meanwhile, does not want
to provide substantive guidance either. This is consistent with a policy-perfecting role. The Court
seeks not to create national security policy but rather to create the best conditions for Congress to
create that policy.
Future events might change this political dynamic. A large terrorist attack by insiders might
prompt Congress to reconsider the applications of national security practices at home. I hope this
does not happen. But if it does, it would be better to have the legal architecture necessary to respond in place before it happens, and not after.
%,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DZ'RHV1RW'HÀQHWKH1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\([FHSWLRQ
&RQJUHVV·VGHÀQLWLRQRI WKHQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\H[FHSWLRQFRXOGFRQVWUDLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVEXW
it is not substantive. International law, conversely, is substantive,259EXWGRHVQRWGHÀQHWKHQDWLRQDO
security exception.260 This is because international law lacks “a pervasive and effective enforcement
mechanism.”261 Conceding this, international-law scholars argue that states comply with international
law for other reasons, including moral suasion, the need for legitimacy, the habit of compliance,262
257 See, e.g$O%LKDQLY2EDPD)G '&&LU  %URZQ-FRQFXUULQJ ´>$@VRWKHUPRUHGLIÀFXOW
cases arise, it is important to ask whether a court-driven process is best suited to protecting both the rights of the
petitioners and the safety of our nation.”).
258 See, e.g., Judge A. Raymond Randolph, Speech to the Heritage Foundation: The Guantanamo Mess (Oct 20,
2010), available at http://www.heritage.org/Events/2010/10/Guantanamo-Mess (addressing the many questions still left
unanswered by the Boumediene case).
259 See generally Monica Hakimi,,QWHUQDWLRQDO6WDQGDUGVIRU'HWDLQLQJ7HUURULVP6XVSHFWV0RYLQJ%H\RQGWKH$UPHG&RQÁLFW
Criminal Divide, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 369 (2008) (discussing that international law offers three models for the detention
of terrorism suspects each of which employs some level of human rights, criminal, and administrative law); Sean
D. Murphy, Evolving Geneva Convention Paradigms in the “War on Terrorism”: Applying the Core Rules to the Release of Persons
Deemed “Unprivileged Combatants,” 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105 (2007) (reasoning that the broad international laws of war
established by the Geneva Conventions allow the law to adapt to the changed environment of terrorism).
260 I mean this descriptively, not normatively. I think it would be better—politically, prudentially and theoretically—
if U.S. national security policy were more constrained by international law. This point is not novel—it is in fact very
common—so I will not press the argument.
261 See Michael P. Scharf, International Law and the Torture Memos, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 321, 322 (2009) (“Lacking
a pervasive and effective enforcement mechanism, scholars and policy makers have pondered whether international law
is really binding law.”). For an excellent summary of the “compliance debate” in international law, see id. at 322-41 (2009).
262 See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2614 (1997)
(discussing the post-World War II move towards implementing international institutions based on multilateral treaties
that allocated responsibility among the transnational members to construct international laws); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE
POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990) (stating nations’ compliance with international law is greatly dependent on
the legitimacy of the nations and their institutions).
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reciprocity costs263 and the prospects of prosecution for violating international law. 264 These pressures lead to the internalization of international law in U.S. decision makers.265
Even those who argue that states have reasons to comply with international law do not argue
WKDWWKH86QDWLRQDOVHFXULW\H[FHSWLRQLVGHÀQHGE\LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ,QGHHGWKHJHQHUDOWHQRU
of internationalist writing is to critique the United States for its failure to comply with international
law.266 And while the Executive purports to comply with international law (and has from the start of
the war on terror),267 a body charged with interpreting the law it enforces will not, in the long run,
be a neutral arbiter of that law. The Bush Administration notoriously acted on its interpretation of
international law to support waterboarding and other putatively unlawful treatment of detainees,268
even though this interpretation was later repudiated by the U.N. Secretary-General, the U.N. Special
Rapporteurs on Torture and Arbitrary Detention, the U.K. House of Commons, the International
Committee of the Red Cross, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, among others.269
7KXVLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZHYHQWKRXJKLWLQÁXHQFHV86EHKDYLRU270 does not constrain it as domestic law does. There was no international body stopping the U.S from targeting al-Aulaqi. Nor does
international law provide a simple way for those harmed by U.S. power to remedy that harm.

263 Scharf, supra note 261, at 357 (“[C]oncern for prosecution in third States or international tribunals under the
LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZFRQFHSWRI XQLYHUVDOMXULVGLFWLRQGRHVVXJJHVWDQH[RJHQRXVLQÁXHQFHRI LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZµ 
264 Id. (“[W]hen U.S. courts interpret international law as a limit to Executive Power . . . we are seeing the concrete
effects of internalization of international law by a disaggregated State.”).
265 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Speech to the Annual Meeting of the American
Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (March 25, 2010), available at http://
www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm [hereinafter “Koh Speech”], (describing the efforts of the Obama
Administration to support international courts and comply with the requirements of the law of war).
266 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Civil Liability of Bush, Cheney, et al. for Torture, Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment
and Forced Disappearance, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 359 (2009) (concluding the members of the Bush Administration
responsible for the forced disappearance of persons and other war crimes should be held civilly liable for their actions);
Mary Ellen O’Connell, When Is a War Not a War? The Myths of the Global War on Terror, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 535,
538 (2006)(contending the Bush Administration’s policies were based on erroneous and contradictory legal analyses that
abused international humanitarian law); Mary Ellen O’Connell, $IÀUPLQJWKH%DQRQ+DUVK,QWHUURJDWLRQ, 66 OHIO ST. L.
J. 1231 (2005)(describing the Bush Administration’s application of wartime privileges in response to Al Qaeda attacks
GHVSLWHWKHIDFWWKDWWKHFRQÁLFWVGLGQRWDPRXQWWRWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZ·VGHÀQLWLRQRI ZDU 
267 See Jack Goldsmith, Detention, the AUMF, and the Bush Administration—Correcting the Record, LAWFARE (September 14,
2010), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2010/09/detention-the-aumf-and-the-bush-administration-correcting-the-record/
(explaining that the Obama Administration’s legal rationale for military detention does not differ much from that of the
Bush Administration because both administrations have derived their powers from the AUMF).
268 Scharf, supraQRWHDW DGGUHVVLQJÀQGLQJVRI WRUWXUHWDFWLFVXVHGRQGHWDLQHHV 
269 Id. at 356 (stating the named organizations all believed that the U.S. treatment of detainees was inconsistent with
international law).
270 But see JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (arguing States’ comply with
international law in an effort to preserve their interests in the international arena).
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International law can become the law of the land.271 But Congress has the power to alter domestic application of treaties and abrogate federal common law.272 There are arguments that international law should apply domestically even against contrary congressional or executive action. But these
arguments have failed in U.S. courts.273
,I WKHSROLWLFDOEUDQFKHVMRLQWO\ÀQGWKHPVHOYHVLQDJUHHPHQWZLWKLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZWKHQWKH\
can change the law. This has already happened in the Guantanamo cases. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,274
the Supreme Court held that the Geneva Conventions covered Guantanamo detainees because Congress had, by statute, incorporated them into U.S. law.275 In response, Congress passed the Military
Commissions Act, providing that alien unlawful enemy combatants tried under the statute may not
use the Geneva Conventions in court.276 There is an argument about whether Congress can lawfully
do this,277 but U.S. courts would likely take Congress’s side in this argument.278
In addition to being law itself, international law can also guide the interpretation of U.S. law.
Courts are required to interpret domestic law consistently with international law.279 The Obama
Administration has concluded that the AUMF should be interpreted in light of the laws of war.280
No matter the interpretive impact of international law, though, its power to constrain the political
branches is limited by the fact that they can alter its domestic application. This is why the most important case in the Guantanamo line—Boumediene—hinges on constitutional law rather than interna271 See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, at § 111 cmt. d (1987) (“Treaties made under the authority of the United
States, like the Constitution and the laws of the United States, are expressly declared to be the ‘supreme Law of the
Land’ by Article VI of the Constitution.”); §115 cmt. e (1987) (“Since any treaty or other international agreement of the
United States, and any rule of customary international law, is federal law (§111), it supersedes inconsistent State law or
policy whether adopted earlier or later.”).
272 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); see also THIRD RESTATMENT, supra note 11, at §
115(1) (the alteration of an international law’s domestic application does not affect the United States’ international
commitments).
273 THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, at § 115(1) (delineating when an act of Congress may supersede an
international agreement); see also5REHUW'HODKXQW\ -RKQ<RRExecutive Power v. International Law+DUY-/ 3XE
Pol’y 73, 75 (2006) (“It appears that no federal court of appeals has ever held that customary international law limits
presidential decisions.”).
274 548 U.S. 557 (2004).
275 Id. at 613, 628-32.
276 10 U.S.C. § 948b(e) (2006) (“No alien unprivileged enemy belligerent subject to trial under this chapter may
invoke the Geneva Conventions as a basis for a private right of action.”). For an excellent discussion of the effect of
this provision see Curtis A. Bradley, The Military Commissions Act, Habeas Corpus, and the Geneva Conventions, 101 AM. J. INT’L
L. 322 (2006) (discussing the criticism the Military Commissions Act has drawn for its restriction on the habeas corpus
review and its treatment of the Geneva Conventions).
277 See Bradley, supra note 276, at 337-41 (raising the question of whether the Geneva Conventions were intended to
be judicially enforceable).
278 Id. at 337-44 (reaching the conclusion that Congress has the right to override treaties for purposes of U.S. law
under the “last-in-time rule”).
279 Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate
the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”).
280 See Koh Speech, supra note 265, at B(1)(b) “[W]e are resting our detention authority on a domestic statute- the
2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)- as informed by the principles of the laws of war.”).
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tional law.
International law can bind the political branches when used as a guide to interpreting the constitution. 281 It is in this role, as guide to the Constitution, that international law will most likely affect
U.S. national security policy. This is not because it is theoretically sounder. Rather, it is pitched in a
rhetoric that is more amenable to judiciary, the branch most likely to recognize outsiders’ rights.
V. MEMBERSHIP AS POLITICS
Here I want to make a political argument. I put it forth as conjecture. Hopefully it is useful even
so. My claim is that without equalizing treatment across citizenship and territory, we will be hard
SUHVVHGWRGHÀQHWKHQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\H[FHSWLRQ7RPDNHWKLVFDVH,ZLOOORRNDWERWKSXEOLFDQG
judicial politics.
A. Public Politics
$V,KDYHWROGWKHVWRU\VRIDUWKHSROLWLFDOEUDQFKHVKDYHLQVWHDGRI VXEVWDQWLYHO\GHÀQLQJQDtional security, simply decided that it is something we do to aliens and people outside the country. If
this is true, it is hard to see why those branches would change.
Outsiders are politically less powerful than insiders. Aliens cannot vote in U.S. elections even
when they reside in the United States. People outside the country are mostly noncitizens. And citizens outside the country, who retain the rights to vote, are not a politically united body in any way
that would allow them to mobilize on issues relevant to them as a class. There is no natural constituency, in other words, that would have objected to the targeting of Al-Aulaqi, on the basis of “extraterritorial rights.”
When it comes to national security, outsiders have less clout than in other contexts. The larger
politics of immigration policy create proxies for the interests of noncitizens in the national debate.
1RQFLWL]HQVKDYHIDPLO\DQGÀQDQFLDOWLHVWR86FLWL]HQVDQGWKHUHDUHHWKQLFYRWLQJEORFNVWKDWFDQ
pressure Congress to consider the views of economic immigrants.282 This representation is imperfect, but it is more than what outsiders subject to the national security power currently have. The
281 The U.S. Constitution does not expressly require consultation with international law, unlike, for instance, the
South African constitution. Judith Resnik, /DZDV$IÀOLDWLRQ´)RUHLJQµ/DZ'HPRFUDWLF)HGHUDOLVPDQG6RYHUHLJQWLVPRI WKH
Nation State, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 33, 43-45 (2008) (comparing South Africa’s implementation of international law to
that of the U.S.); S. Afr. Const. (1996) pmbl., ch. 2, § 39 (declaring courts must consider democratic society’s values,
international law; and may consider foreign law when interpreting the Bill of Rights). But, as Professor Sarah Cleveland
has noted, international law is threaded through the Constitution. See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International
Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2006) [Hereinafter Cleveland, International]. Most obviously, “war” is a term of art
in the Constitution. See supra Part IV.A. And international law has informed courts’ reading of this term. Cleveland,
International, at 20-27; see also Vladeck, supra note 4.
282 See, e.g., Victor C. Romero, On Elián and the Aliens: A Political Solution to the Plenary Power Problem, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL’Y, 343, 367-68 (2010) (stating Latinos and Asians will soon achieve the majority status in the U.S. and will
then be able to effectively change immigration policy if they so choose).
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largest single block subject to national security practices are Arab and Muslim men; they were overwhelmingly the subjects of preventive detention after 9/11.283 But Arab and Muslim U.S. citizens are
QRWDODUJHHQRXJKYRWLQJEORFNWRLQÁXHQFHGRPHVWLFSROLWLFV284 even assuming that they constitute
a voting block for these purposes (and I do not know that they do).
As for people outside the country, there are obvious reasons that they won’t form a cohesive
political unit. They are divided by language and culture. Consider the actual targets of U.S. national
security practices. There is no large domestic voting block whose interests are aligned with Khaled
el-Masri—no U.S. voter whose fear of extraordinary rendition would make them insist on limiting
government power. No citizen at home will be rendered to torture.
The relative powerlessness of outsiders also exacerbates the tendency of Congress to defer to
the Executive in the use of the national security power. Some scholars argue that we are living in a
“national security state” in which the Executive’s power to act in the name of national security goes
relatively unchecked by Congress.285 Constitutional scholars have worried that Congress has not
acted to restrain the Executive for violating the War Powers Act by bombing Libya. 286 But if Congress is not inclined to check the Executive in its pursuit of territorial war—the kind of thing we
are doing in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya—there will be less incentive to do so in the nonterritorial
LQWHUYHQWLRQV,DPGHVFULELQJ7HUULWRULDOZDUVDIWHUDOOWDNHDVLJQLÀFDQWFRPPLWPHQWRI QDWLRQDO
resources and draw public attention. This is less true for the targeted interventions typical of nonterULWRULDOFRQÁLFW
1RUFDQZHUHO\RQWKH([HFXWLYHWRGHÀQHQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\,WLVKDUGWRVHHKRZWKHUHZLOOEH
real political pressure on the President to protect outsiders. The same dynamics that prevent outsidHUVIURPLQÁXHQFLQJ&RQJUHVVLRQDODFWLRQDSSO\WRWKH([HFXWLYH1RUKDYHZHVHHQVLJQLÀFDQWSRlitical pushback to the Executive’s decisions to target outsiders. Consider the political response—or
lack thereof—to the Obama Administration’s decision to kill a U.S. citizen, or the failure of victims
of extraordinary rendition to garner a political remedy.
There has been one exception—Guantanamo. Guantanamo became a political issue. But the
political salience of Guantanamo was spurred on by the willingness of courts to take cases from
Guantanamo detainees.

283 DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM,
22-46, 88-128 (2005) (discussing how the Department of Justice’s detention tactics not only violated criminal and
immigration law standards but also failed at actually capturing terrorists by basing their detention standards on race).
284 Less than 1% of the U.S. population is Muslim. Cathy Lynn Grossman, Number of U.S. Muslims to Double, USA
TODAY (Jan. 26 2011), http://www.usatoday.com/news/religion/2011-01-27-1Amuslim27_ST_N.htm. As of 2008, there
ZHUHDQHVWLPDWHGPLOOLRQVHOILGHQWLÀHG$UDE$PHULFDQVLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVSee Scott Mcleod, Where Arab Votes
Could be Crucial, MIDDLE EAST BLOG, TIME (September 18, 2008), http://mideast.blogs.time.com/2008/09/18/will_the_
arab_vote_count_for_o/.
285 See generally6DQIRUG/HYLQVRQ -DFN0%DONLQConstitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 1789 (2010).
286 Bruce Ackerman, Legal Acrobatics, Illegal War, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2011, at A27.
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B. Judicial Politics
In the last decade or so, progressive scholars have argued that the political branches, and not
the judiciary, are—for normative, historical and prudential reasons—the best guardians of the
Constitution. They have proposed various versions of popular constitutionalism—some weak and
some strong—all of which relegate the courts to a lesser role in constitutional interpretation.287 This
VFKRODUVKLS³ZKLFKZDVSURÀOLFIRUDZKLOH288—has received some pushback.289 Whatever one makes
of popular constitutionalism, though, courts are the best near-term hope for outsiders against the
national security power.
The national security power, on the other hand, operates in secret, both because there is a
legitimate need for government secrecy and because the deference granted the Executive by other
branches allows it to escape oversight. When outsiders are targets, the government has additional
ways to limit their political power. Most outsiders are unable to vote. Nor can they generally bring
their issues to the public. The U.S. media is less inclined to cover events in Bosnia-Herzegovina than
in Kansas. When using the national security power, the political branches also have the power to control outsiders—to put someone where political recourse is unavailable to them. Most obviously, it can
do this by operating covertly, by killing people without process or placing them in dark sites where
they cannot access lawyers or reporters. Less drastically, it can move detainees out of the country, or,
as it allegedly did in al Maqaleh, from their home countries into a theater of war.290
7KHLQDELOLW\WRJHWLQWRFRXUWFUHDWHVLWVRZQLQYLVLELOLW\$GMXGLFDWLRQÀ[HVIDFWVLWHVWDEOLVKHV
a narrative that the media and politicians can refer to. Political awareness of extraordinary rendition
would rise if one of the victimized transferees won a verdict—indeed, it would rise if the victims
could reach the merits phase of a trial, which would allow for discovery and testimony. Indeed, the
PHUHÀOLQJRI DFRPSODLQWIRUFHVDFRXUWWROLVWHQWRWKHFRPSODLQDQW7KLVGRHVQRWPHDQWKDWWKH
complainant will win, or that the court will even have jurisdiction. But to someone who is pushed
outside the legal system—to a detainee in Guantanamo or Afghanistan—the very ability to argue
in court, even if only at the pleadings, is a way to demonstrate humanity. Outsiders, in literal terms,
are asking to be “people”291 under the Constitution.292 Courts are the doorways to that personhood.
The courts’ role as arbiter of personhood is consistent with policy perfection. Stated at this level
of abstraction, the claim seems airy. But it presents itself tangibly. If the government is not able to
kill people without trial because they are outside the United States, it must ask itself whether kill287 See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004);
JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
COURTS (1999); RICHARD D. PARKER, “HERE THE PEOPLE RULE”: A POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALIST MANIFESTO (1994).
288 See id.
289 See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1013 (2004).
290 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
291 U.S. CONST. Am. IV (protecting the right of the “people”). See also U.S. CONST. Ams. V, XIV (protecting the rights
of “person[s])”.
292 The judicial battle over personhood is jurisdictional, and jurisdiction has been the main sticking point in these
cases—in the habeas claims of the Guantanamo and Bagram detainees, but also the political-question and state-secrets
doctrines that prevent other outsiders from pressing their claims. See supra Parts II.A. and II.C.
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ing people without trial is a good idea. If it cannot preventively detain people because they are not
citizens, it must ask itself whether it should preventively detain citizens.
Indeed, Boumediene proves this claim. It establishes that noncitizens outside the country sometimes have the right to get into court.293 Ultimately, this will push the issue of extraterritorial rights—
and associated war-on-terror issues, back to Congress. Given its options, policy perfection is probably the Court’s best choice. The debate, as it is now structured, is between progressives who want
the Court to adopt international law and more conservative scholars who are happier to leave total
control with the political branches. But the Court will not take either choice. It is doctrinally and
politically constrained from adopting international law.294 Nor can the Court leave the war power
entirely to the political branches.295
7KH&RXUWWKXVIDFHVDFKRLFHLWFDQGHÀQHWKHQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\H[FHSWLRQLWVHOIRULWFDQWU\WR
SXVKWKHLVVXHEDFNWRWKHSROLWLFDOEUDQFKHV%HOLHYLQJLWVHOI XQTXDOLÀHGWRXQLODWHUDOO\GHÀQHWKH
national security exception, the Court has held that outsiders sometimes have rights, hoping that this
will force Congress to instantiate them.
The Court’s desire to involve Congress is perfectly plain. As it explained in Boumediene:
%HFDXVHRXU1DWLRQ·VSDVWPLOLWDU\FRQÁLFWVKDYHEHHQRI OLPLWHGGXUDWLRQLWKDVEHHQ
SRVVLEOHWROHDYHWKHRXWHUERXQGDULHVRI ZDUSRZHUVXQGHÀQHG,IDVVRPHIHDUWHUrorism continues to pose dangerous threats to us for years to come, the Court might
not have this luxury. This result is not inevitable, however. The political branches, consistent with their independent obligations to interpret and uphold the Constitution,
can engage in a genuine debate about how best to preserve constitutional values while
protecting the Nation from terrorism.296
VI. SOLUTIONS
In this section I want to draw out the implications of my theory. First, I want to make some predictions about what will happen and then some loose recommendations about what we should do. I
say “loose” because a mandate towards equality does not predict any single outcome, and cannot be
effectuated through any single doctrinal pathway. That said, equality has consequences that are not
captured by any other approach.
First, I do not think that the courts (or, for that matter Congress) will expressly rely on “equality” to guide their decisions about outsiders, except to the extent that the Equal Protection Clause
requires equal treatment of noncitizens at home.297 If the Court rejects membership, it will be
293 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008).
294 Supra Part IV.B.
295 See supra Part IV.A.
296 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797-98; See also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[J]
udicial insistence upon that consultation does not weaken our Nation’s ability to deal with danger. To the contrary, that
insistence strengthens the Nation’s ability to determine—through democratic means—how best to do so.”).
297 See generally Neal Katyal, Equality in the War on Terror, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1365 (2007).
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through decisions that reduce the salience of citizenship and territory against applications of the
national security power. Because the Court mostly uses doctrinal and originalist rhetoric to justify its
decisions, future decisions will use these modalities, as Boumediene did.298
Second, the courts will not embrace international law as an independent restraint on the political
branches. Rather, if the Supreme Court rejects membership, it will rely on the Constitution. Still, in
the long run rejection of the membership model will push the United States towards international
law even if international law does not form the basis of that rejection. If any branch is forced to
VXEVWDQWLYHO\GHÀQHQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZLVWKHREYLRXVVRXUFH7KH&RXUWIRULQVWDQFH
could use international law to determine the constitutional limit of the war power.299 Or the judicial
requirement that outsiders be treated equally might lead Congress to use international law to control
DQGGHÀQHQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\
Normatively, the membership theory suggests a political strategy for those who are interested in
protecting outsiders’ rights and fostering Congressional engagement with national security law. This
strategy is to allow some domestic application of national security practices in exchange for equal
treatment of outsiders. Progressives should be open to accepting a national security court if they
can ensure it treats citizens, aliens, and people captured abroad equally, and, more importantly, that
they are equally likely to end up in that court.
The same is true of preventive detention. Indeed, equality should be the price of admission for
progressive involvement in the creation of new national security approaches. For preventive detention this would mean not just the creation of a preventive-detention law that applies to citizens at
home but also changes to immigration law that prevent the Executive from using it as preventive
detention.300 Any such law would also have to provide that it was the exclusive means of preventive
detention.301
For aliens inside the United States, the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses are the clearest pathways to equality against national security practices.302 There is, for example, a case that the
Military Commission Acts’ differential treatment of territorial aliens violates Equal Protection.303
Rejection of membership suggests presumptive equality for extraterritorial recognition of rights
against the war powers. This does not mean that location never matters. It means only that locaWLRQPDWWHUVRQO\LQVRIDUDVLWUHODWHVWRVRPHRWKHUUHDVRQ,WLVPRUHGLIÀFXOWIRUWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
to observe Constitutional rights in extraterritorial actions like the raid on Osama Bin Laden than it
is when acting at home. But lumping the Bin Laden attack in with the rendition of el-Masri merely
because both occurred overseas is foolish. Courts should be able to look past the categorization of
“abroad” and see whether national security interests are actually at stake.
298 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739-72. As someone who tends to think that these modalities produce indeterminate
results, at least for these kinds of purposes, I am not worried that the Court will be unable to reject membership if it
uses them. C.f. Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009).
299 See supra Part IV.B.
300 See Cole, supra note 5, at 740-41.
301 C.f. id. at 748-50.
302 See generally Katyal, supra note 297.
303 Id.
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This requires the disentangling of substantive and membership factors. The notion of a “battleÀHOGµZKLFKFDQH[LVWHLWKHUDWKRPHRUDEURDGVKRXOGEHGLIIHUHQWLDWHGIURPWHUULWRULDOLW\304 It
VHHPVSODXVLEOHWKDWSHRSOHFDSWXUHGRQDWHUULWRULDOEDWWOHÀHOGVKRXOGEHWUHDWHGGLIIHUHQWO\WKDQ
people simply captured abroad. Similarly, the site of capture, which can tell us something about the
threat a target poses and the cost of capturing him, should be distinguished from the site of detention, which tells us where the Executive wants to keep someone. More broadly, the Executive should
not be able to divest someone of rights by moving them. If there are extrinsic reasons to keep
VRPHRQHLQDSODFHZKHUHLWLVGLIÀFXOWWRDIIRUGULJKWVWKLVPLJKWMXVWLI\GLIIHUHQWLDOWUHDWPHQW%XW
the mere decision to detain someone abroad—even in a theater of war—should not justify discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Equality is a risk. It ties the rights of the powerless to the powerful, trusting that the powerful
ZLOOKDYHWKHZLVGRPWRJRYHUQWKHPVHOYHV,GRQRWNQRZWKDWWKLVWUXVWLVMXVWLÀHG%XWLI WKHUHLV
a way forward for outsiders, it is this way, because it takes the body politic as it is. There are other,
clearer visions of the good, but each relies on some structure that does not exist—an international
body, committed to universal rights, that can bring the United States to heel, or a Congress inclined
to care about what happens to aliens abroad. These visions are themselves a kind of politics, but
they speak to a future time. Equality is a bridge to that time.

 &DSWXUHRQWKHEDWWOHÀHOGLVDSODXVLEOHIDFWRULQGHWHUPLQLQJZKHWKHUWKHQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\H[FHSWLRQDSSOLHVLQ
DSDUWLFXODUFDVHWKHEDWWOHÀHOGLWVHOI LVOLPLWHGLQDZD\WKDWFRQVWUDLQVWKHQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\SRZHU DVVXPLQJWKDWWKH
EDWWOHÀHOGLVDFRQWLJXRXVDUHD $QG´EDWWOHÀHOGµKRZHYHUGHÀQHGLVGLVWLQFWIURPPHPEHUVKLSLQWKDWWKHUHFDQEH
EDWWOHÀHOGVLQVLGHWKHFRXQWU\DVLQWKH&LYLO:DU,QWKHPRGHUQFRQWH[WLPDJLQHZKDWZRXOGKDSSHQLI WKHUHZHUH
another terrorist attack on the scale of 9/11. It could be plausible to treat people captured near the attack under a
different set of rules. So long as citizens and noncitizens in the affected area were treated the same, this treatment would
be substantive, not membership based.

